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I. INTRODUCTION
Exemption statutes entitle a debtor to retain property free
from the claims of his creditors' by providing that specified prop-
erty cannot be subjected to judicial process to enforce the owner's
debts.2 Exemption statutes as originally drafted served two func-
tions. First, the statutes allowed a debtor to retain property suffi-
cient to prevent the debtor and his dependents from becoming
destitute and public charges. Thus, most statutes were drafted
to insure that a debtor could retain property essential to main-
taining a decent standard of living for himself and his depen-
dents. Second, legislatures in some jurisdictions drafted exemp-
tion statutes to enable a debtor to rehabilitate himself. In these
jurisdictions a debtor was entitled to retain not only property
essential to his well being, but also income producing property.'
Most jurisdictions originally enacted exemption statutes in the
nineteenth century and many states have failed to update these
statutes to reflect changes in social and economic conditions. 5
Thus, the exemption statutes are often inadequate to accomplish
1. See generally Vukowich, Debtor's Exemption Rights, 62 GEo. L.J. 779 (1974);
Wall, Homestead and the Process of History: The Proposed Changes in Article X, Section
4, 6 FMA. ST. L. Rav. 877, 878-95 (1978); Comment, Personal Property Exemptions and
the Uniform Exemption Act, 1978 B.Y.U.L. Rzv. 462, 466-69.
2. See, e.g., S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-41-10 to -460 (1976).
3. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1978) reprinted in full with original
pagination at [1978] 11C U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 179.
4. See Vukowich, supra note 1, at 786. South Carolina's original homestead exemp-
tion statute, enacted in 1868, served this function by entitling a debtor to retain lands of
sufficient value to generate funds to repay his creditors. 14 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 19-20, Act. No. 16, § 1 (1868). See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONvEN-
TION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 473, 486, 497-98 (1868) [hereinafter cited as 1868 PROCEED-
INGS].
5. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 126; Countryman, For a New Exemp-
tion Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 678 (1960); Countryman, Consumer Bank-
ruptcy-Some Recent Changes and Some PrOl3osals, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 165 (1971).
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their intended purposes.8 For example, in South Carolina the
basic statutory exemption has remained unchanged since 1868. 7
This exemption, although adequate and perhaps liberal when
originally enacted, appears inadequate in today's economy. That
South Carolina's statutory exemptions may no longer accomplish
their intended purposes would, in itself, justify an exploration of
the need for reform.
State exemption statutes, however, are also functionally re-
lated to federal bankruptcy proceedings. This article, therefore,
examines South Carolina's statutory exemptions, and the func-
tional relationship between those exemptions and nonbusiness
bankruptcies. It first reviews the historical background and judi-
cial interpretation of South Carolina's exemptions to demon-
strate that the power of the General Assembly to enact exemption
statutes is limited by a provision s of the South Carolina constitu-
tion. The limited grant of legislative power to enact exemptions
renders constitutionally suspect the validity of South Carolina's
statutory exemptions of earnings for personal services. If these
exemptions are declared unconstitutional, a significant portion of
a debtor's earnings will be subject to judicial process. One conse-
quence of voiding these statutory exemptions will be to create an
incentive for debtors in South Carolina to file petitions for
straight bankruptcy in order to retain their postbankruptcy earn-
ings free from the claims of their prebankruptcy creditors.
The article then examines the potential impact of the exemp-
tion provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 upon con-
sumer bankruptcies in South Carolina. The current Bankruptcy
Act provides that a bankrupt is entitled to retain the property he
owns on the date he files his petition that is exempt under the
laws of the state in which he is domiciled."0 Thus, a South Caro-
linian filing under the Bankruptcy Act is entitled to assert against
the bankruptcy trustee those statutory exemptions he could as-
sert against his creditors in state law collection actions. Title I of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 enacted the Bankruptcy
6. See sources cited in note 5 supra.
7. Compare 14 STATUTE AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAIoUNA 19, Act No. 16 (1868) with S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-41-10 to -460 (1976).
8. S.C. CONST. art. H, § 28 (1895).
9. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) reprinted
in [1978] 11C U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws.
10. Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
1979]
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Code," which will apply to all bankruptcy cases commenced after
September 30, 1979.11 The Bankruptcy Code potentially changes
the Bankruptcy Act's policy of incorporating state law exemp-
tions in bankruptcy proceedings. Section 522(b)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code entitles an individual debtor to elect to claim in
bankruptcy proceedings the "federal exemptions" enumerated in
section 522(d) in lieu of those provided under state law unless the
state of the debtor's domicile enacts legislation specifically de-
priving debtors of the right to elect federal exemptions. The
federal exemptions are significantly larger than South Carolina's
statutory exemptions. Unless the General Assembly acts to de-
prive debtors of the right to claim the federal exemptions, an
additional incentive for consumer debtors to file in bankruptcy
will arise. This article considers the advisability of the General
Assembly's enacting legislation to remove the right to claim the
federal exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings.
Finally, this article proposes a course of constitutional and
legislative reform of South Carolina's exemption law. The reforms
suggested are designed to assure that the state's exemption stat-
utes will be adequate to achieve their fundamental purposes and
will not frustrate sound bankruptcy policy.
II. HISTORY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA ExEMPTIONS:
CONSTITUTIONAV LIMTATIoNs
Prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1868 virtually all
of a debtor's property was subject to judicial process for the satis-
faction of his debt. The only exemption statute in effect at the
time of the Constitutional Convention of 1868 was an act of 1823
that exempted a limited number of essential items of personal
property from levy and sale.' 5 In 1851 the General Assembly en-
acted a liberal homestead exemption under which the head of a
family could exempt a dwelling house and fifty acres of land with
a value not in excess of five hundred dollars provided that the real
estate was not located in a city or incorporated town. 6 The home-
11. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 101, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549-2657
(1978) reprinted in [1978] 11C U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Code].
12. Id. § 402(a).
13. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 522(b)(1).
14. See notes 199.217 and accompanying text infra.
15. 6 STATUTES AT LmRGwE OF SOUTH CAROLiNA 213, 214, Act No. 2315, § 4 (1823).
16, 12 STATurEs AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 77, Act No. 4041 (1851).
[Vol. 30
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stead exemption of 1851, however, was short-lived. In 1857, the
General Assembly repealed the statutory exemption.' 7 The Con-
stitutional Convention of 1868 thus set to work upon a legal sys-
tem that had tolerated only inconsequential exemptions of prop-
erty from the enforceability of obligations.
The provision for exemptions from liability for debts was one
of the more hotly debated issues at the Constitutional Convention
of 1868.18 Most delegates to the convention agreed that the consti-
tution should include a section entitling debtors to retain some
property free from the claims of their creditors. There was, how-
ever, significant disagreement upon two points. The first and
most substantial division of opinion concerned the retrospective
application of the exemption provision. The proponents of re-
trospective exemptions argued that such a provision was essential
to insure that the constitution would be ratified.'9 Their oppo-
nents argued that it was unlawful'to exempt property from appli-
cation toward the satisfaction of debts that arose prior to the
adoption of the constitution."0 After lengthy debate the delegates
voted down a proposal that would have limited the exemption to
prospective application.2' The delegates then adopted exemption
provisions that were silent on the point of retrospective applica-
tion. The clear consensus of the convention, however, was that
the exemptions should apply retrospectively, provided that such
application did not violate the United States Constitution.2 The
delegates conceded that the constitutional issue would have to
await resolution in the courts.?
The second point upon which the delegates disagreed was the
extent of the exemptions. Various proposals were introduced to
limit both the dollar value of exempt property and the types of
property upon which the exemption could be claimed.24 Even the
17. Id. at 575, Act No. 4383 (1857).
18. 1868 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 452 and passim.
19. Id. at 467-70.
20. Id. at 473.
21. Id. at 482.
22. Id. at 467-70.
23. Id. at 467-68. The South Carolina Supreme Court was quick to rule on the consti-
tutional question and upheld the validity of a retrospective application of homestead
exemptions. In re Kennedy, 2 S.C. 216 (1870). However, this interpretation was expressly
overruled by the court in Cochran v. Darcy, 5 S.C. 125 (1873) on the authority of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872),
which struck down as an unconstitutional impairment of contract retrospective aspects
of the Georgia homestead exemption law.
24. 1868 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 452, 458-60, 865, 880-81, 888. A motion to
1979] 647
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leading proponent of liberal retrospective exemptions argued that
a reasonable maximum dollar limitation be placed upon the ex-
emptions in order to insure that the courts would sustain the
exemptions under a challenge asserting that the exemptions
amounted to a repudiation of all debts.2
The placement and precise language of the exemption provi-
sions adopted by the convention of 1868 must be carefully consid-
ered in view of the judicial interpretation subsequently placed
upon them. The constitution of 1868 includes two provisions ad-
dressing the topic of exemptions. The first provision appears in
article I of the constitution, the "Declaration of Rights." Article
I, section 20 provides:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud;
and a reasonable amount of property, as a homestead, shall be
exempted from seizure or sale for the payment of any debts or
liabilities, except for the payment of such obligations as are
provided for in this Constitution.26
The second provision of the constitution of 1868 addressing ex-
emptions appears in article II, the "Legislative Department."' '
Article 1I, section 32 set forth in precise detail the persons entitled
to claim the exemption, the maximum value of property that
could be claimed as exempt, the types or items of property to
amend to exempt debts contracted for labor was defeated, id. at 458-60, as was a motion
to reduce the value of the exemption from $2000 to $1000, id. at 460. The substitute pro-
vision of the legislative committee to the convention included a homestead exemption of
up to $1000 plus the yearly products thereof and a personal property exemption limit of
$500. Id. at 865. In explaining the reduction of amount and the addition of the yearly
products exemption, the committee reported that such action was taken in reliance that
"yearly products" would amply offset the difference in amount, and in some instances
would be more valuable. Id. at 888. Minor revisions in the types of personal property to
be exempt were proposed, id. at 880-81, and adopted, id. at 888, but the section passed
virtually as reported from committee.
25. Id. at 882. The proponent, C.P. Leslie of Barnwell, stated:
If we propose to make a homestead for any other than charitable purposes, the
courts will not sustain it. If we pass a sweeping homestead law to secure the
debtor against his just debts, we will fail in our efforts. But if we pass a fair,
reasonable law, that appears to be necessary, the courts will sustain it and
uphold it. If we undertake, however, to cover up an unusual sum of money from
the creditor, the courts cannot sustain it, and they will declare the homestead
bill, a bill to repudiate debts, and it will be defeated. . . .[W]e must be
moderate in our demands, or we will certainly lose all.
Leslie was such an ardent advocate of a retrospective homestead provision that while
arguing in favor of the provision he was overcome with emotion and burst into tears.
Id, at 474.
26. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20 (1868).
27. Id. art. II, § 32 (1868).
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which the exemption applied, and the types of obligations against
which the exemption could not be asserted.s Article II, section 32
entitled the head of a family residing in South Carolina to exempt
the family homestead from attachment, levy, or sale on any
mesne or final process. The family homestead was defined as the
debtor's "dwelling house, out-buildings and lands appurtenant,
not to exceed the value of one thousand dollars, and yearly prod-
uct thereof .. ".. ,,2 In addition, article III, section 32 provided
that the head of any family was entitled to claim a five hundred
dollar exemption in certain precisely enumerated types of per-
sonal property." Finally, the section entitled the head of the
household to exempt "all necessary wearing apparel."' 3' Article II,
section 32 concluded with the following mandate to the legisla-
ture: "It shall be the duty of the General Assembly, at their first
session, to enforce the provisions of this Section by suitable legis-
lation. '3
2
The General Assembly responded to this mandate in 1868 by
passing "An Act to Determine and Perpetuate the Homestead.
'3
This statute limited the statutory exemptions to those provided
in article II, section 32 of the constitution of 1868.31 In 1870 the
General Assembly adopted a statute, primarily to clarify the pro-
28. Article II, § 32 of the 1868 constitution provided:
The family homestead of the head of each family residing in this State, such
homestead consisting of dwelling-house, out-buildings, and lands appurtenant,
not to exceed the value of one thousand dollars, and yearly product thereof, shall
be exempt from attachment, levy or sale on any mesne or final process issued
from any Court. To secure the full enjoyment of said homestead exemption to
the person entitled thereto, or to the head of any family, the personal property
of such person, of the following character, to-wit: household furniture, beds and
bedding, family library, arms, carts, wagons, farming implements, tools, neat
cattle, work animals, swine, goats and sheep, not to exceed in value, in the
aggregate, the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be subject to like exemption
as said homestead, and there shall be exempt, in addition thereto, all necessary
wearing apparel: Provided, That no property shall be exempt from attachment,
levy or sale, for taxes, or for payment of obligations contracted for the purchase
of said homestead, or the erection of improvements thereon: Provided, further,
That the yearly products of said homestead shall not be exempt from attach-
ment, levy or sale, for the payment of obligations contracted in the production
of the same. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly, at their first session,
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cedure by which a debtor could claim his personal property ex-
emptions.5 Section 2 of the Act, however, provided an exemption
for all "the products of agricultural laborers, mechanics, artisans,
and tradesmen. ... ,3This provision clearly granted a statutory
exemption in personal property that was not expressly authorized
in article II, section 32 of the constitution. In addition, the value
of the property subject to the exemption could exceed the five
hundred dollar limitation imposed by the constitution. In 1872
the General Assembly adopted an Act to reduce to a single statute
all acts relating to the homestead exemption. 37 Included in the
1872 Act was a modified version of section 2 of the 1870 'Act.
Specifically section 9 of the 1872 Act provided, "That one-third
of the annual products of agricultural laborers, mechanics, artis-
ans and tradesmen of every description, without regard to valua-
tion, character or condilion [sic] of products or earnings, shall
be exempt from attachment, levy and sale, except to enforce the
payment of taxes."
The constitutional validity of this statutory exemption was
challenged in Duncan v. Barnett.39 In Duncan the judgment
debtor was an agricultural laborer owning no lands and having
personal property worth less than five hundred dollars. The sher-
iff had levied execution on two bales of cotton, some seed cotton,
and corn. The judgment debtor claimed that these items were
exempt under section 9 of the 1872 Act. As the total value of the
judgment debtor's personal property, including that levied upon,
was worth less than five hundred dollars the South Carolina Su-
preme Court was not forced to address the issue of whether the
General Assembly had the broad power to increase the size of the
personal property exemption granted in the constitution. Rather
the issue as framed by the court was merely "whether the legisla-
ture could create new subjects of exemption in addition to those
enumerated in the constitution."4 The court concluded that the
legislature had exceeded its power and held that since the prod-
ucts of agricultural laborers were not included in the classes of
personal property delineated in article I, section 32 of the consti-
tution the statutory exemption was unconstitutional and void. In
35. Id. at 380, Act No. 273 (1870).
36. Id. § 2.
37. 15 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 229, Act No. 176 (1872).
38. Id. at 231-32, Act No. 176, § 9.
39. 11 S.C. 333 (1878).
40. Id. at 334.
650 [Vol. 30
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reaching its decision th4 court started from the premise that the
enforceability of obligations was a principle fundamental to the
State's jurisprudence,4" and that the excessive relaxation of laws
for the enforcement of obligations "might unsettle the very
comer-stone on which that jurisprudence rests .... ",42 From this
premise the court reasoned that article I, section 32 of the consti-
tution was intended to limit the power of the legislature to enact
exemption statutes. The court concluded that "the exemptions
allowed by the constitution cannot be extended or restricted by
any act of the legislature."43
The South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle
of Duncan v. Barnett in Norton v. Bradham.44 Writing for the
court Justice McIver carefully analyzed the exemption provisions
of the constitution of 1868. The court found it significant that the
constitution contained two provisions relating to exemptions: the
general right to a reasonable exemption set forth in article I,
section 20; and the specific and detailed grant of legislative au-
thority to enact exemption statutes set forth in article II, section
32. 41 In Justice Mclver's words,
If the framers of the constitution had contented themselves sim-
ply with the insertion of section 20 of Article I., then, clearly,
the legislature would have had the power to enact any law upon
the subject, not inconsistent with the general right thus guaran-
teed. They could have fixed the amount and character of prop-
erty to be exempted and designated the persons entitled to
claim such exemption, as well as the mode of proceeding by
which such claim should be asserted. But when the people in
their sovereign capacity, acting through a convention, went on
and by section 32 of Article I., prescribed what should be the
nature and character of the homestead and personal property
exempted, describing what it should be, the particular kind of
property, its amount and value, and to whose benefit it should
enure, all these matters were placed beyond the domain of legis-
lative power and nothing was left for the general assembly to do,
except what was prescribed in the last clause of the sec-
tion-pass the laws necessary and suitable "to enforce the provi-
sions of this section." Hence, whenever the legislature under-
41. Id. at 335.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 336.
44. 21 S.C. 375 (1884).
45. Id. at 379-80.
19791
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takes to interpolate other provisions than those prescribed in
that section, instead of simply confining themselves, as directed
by the organic law, to the enactment of laws suitable for carry-
ing into effect the provisions there prescribed, they are invading
a province already fully occupied by the constitution, and tran-
scending the limitation placed upon their powers by that instru-
ment."
The supreme court's interpretation of the 1868 constitution
clearly established the principle that article I, section 32 was a
limited grant of legislative power. Any statute granting an ex-
emption beyond those specified in that section was unconstitu-
tional and void.4"
In 1880 the General Assembly ratified an amendment to arti-
cle II, section 32 of the constitution of 1868.11 Although the
amendment completely reworded section 32, it altered the provi-
sion in only two respects. First, the specification of the types of
personal property that a debtor could claim as exempt was de-
46. Id.
47. The Supreme Court of North Carolina imposed an identical interpretation upon
the exemption provision in its reconstruction constitution. In Wharton v. Taylor, 88 N.C.
230 (1883), the court ruled upon the power of the legislature to establish homestead
exemptions. The court held that the state constitution set limits upon the homestead and
personal property exemptions and that any legislation that altered the value or duration
of the exemptions was unconstitutional.
48. 17 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROUNA 320, Act No. 263 (1880). The amend-
ment was as follows:
That Section 32, Article 2, of the Constitution of this State be, and is
hereby, stricken out, and the following inserted in lieu thereof:
The General Assembly shall enact such laws as will exempt from attach-
ment and sale under any mesne or final process issued from any Court to the
head of any family residing in this State a homestead in lands, whether held in
fee or any lesser estate, not to exceed in value one thousand dollars, with the
yearly products thereof; and every head of a family residing in this State,
whether entitled to a homestead exemption in lands or not, personal property
not to exceed in value the sum of five hundred dollars: Provided, That in case
any woman having a separate estate shall be married to the head of a family
who has not of his own sufficient property to constitute a homestead as hereinbe-
fore provided, said married woman shall be entitled to a like exemption as
provided for the head of a family: Provided, Further, That there shall not be
an allowance of more than one thousand dollars worth of real estate and more
than five hundred dollars worth of personal property to the husband and wife
jointly: Provided, That no property shall be exempt from attachment, levy or
sale for taxes, or for payment of obligations" contracted for the purchase of said
homestead or the erection of improvements thereon: Provided, Further, That
the yearly products of said homestead shall not be exempt from attachment,
levy or sale, for the payment of obligations contracted in the production of the
same. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly at their first session to
enforce the provisions of this Section by suitable legislation.
10
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leted from the constitution." The amendment entitled the head
of a family to claim the five hundred dollar personal property
exemption in any species of personal property. Second, the
amendment clarified the right of a head of a family who did not
own real estate, the homestead proper, to claim the exemption in
personal property. 0 The General Assembly did not increase the
value of the property that could be claimed as exempt. Indeed the
amended article II, section 32 limited more emphatically the
amount of the personal property exemption to five hundred dol-
lars by deleting the exemption for wearing apparel.5
The current constitution of South Carolina, adopted in 1895,
contains only one provision concerning exemptions, which is lo-
cated in article III, entitled "Legislative Department."52 Article
49. Id. Under the 1880 amendment, the homestead exemption could consist of any
interest in lands. The requirement that the homestead consist of a "dwelling-house, out-
buildings, and lands appurtenant" was deleted. The 1880 amendment also removed the
enumeration of items of personal property that the head of family could claim as exempt.
50. Id.
51. Id. The amended provision deleted the exemption for "all necessary wearing
apparel," that under the original article H, section 32 the head of a family could claim in
addition to the five hundred dollar personal property exemption.
52. S.C. CONsT. art. H, § 28 (1895) provides:
The General Assembly shall enact such laws as will exempt from attach-
ment, levy and sale under any mesne or final process issued from any Court, to
the head of any family residing in this State, a homestead in lands, whether held
in fee or any lesser estate, to the value of one thousand dollars, or so much
thereof as the property is worth if its value is less than one thousand dollars,
with the yearly products thereof, and to every head of a family residing in this
State, whether entitled to a homestead exemption in lands or not, personal
property to the value of five hundred dollars, or so much thereof as the property
is worth if its value is less than five hundred dollars. The title to the homestead
to be set off and assigned shall be absolute and be forever discharged from all
debts of the said debtor then existing or thereafter contracted except as herein-
after provided: Provided, That in case any woman having a separate estate shall
be married to the head of a family who has not of his own sufficient property to
constitute a homestead as hereinbefore provided, said married woman shall be
entitled to a like exemption as provided for the head of the family: Provided,
Further, That there shall not be an allowance of more than one thousand dollars'
worth of real estate and more than five hundred dollars' worth of personal
property to the husband and wife jointly: Provided, Further, That no property
shall be exempt from attachment, levy or sale for taxes, or for payment of
obligations contracted for the purchase of said homestead or personal property
exemption or the erection or making of improvements or repairs thereon:
Provided, Further, That the yearly products of said homestead shall not be
exempt from attachment, levy or sale for the payment of obligations contracted
in the production of the same: Provided, Further, That no waiver shall defeat
the right of homestead before assignment except it be by deed of conveyance,
or by mortgage, and only as against the mortgage debt; and no judgment credi-
tor or other creditor whose lien does not bind the homestead shall have any right
11
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I, section 28 is in most material aspects identical to article II,
section 32 of the constitution of 1868 as amended. 53 The constitu-
tion' of 1895 entitles a head of a family residing in South Carolina
to a homestead exemption in an interest in land not to exceed one
thousand dollars in value. The head of a family is also entitled
to an exemption of personal property not to exceed fi- e hundred
dollars in value. The constitution of 1895 did, however, add a
personal property exemption for an individual who is not the head
of a family. 4 This exemption consists of "all necessary wearing
apparel and tools and implements of trade, not to exceed in value
the sum of three hundred dollars." Thus, the maximum value of
personal property exempt from judicial process under the consti-
tution of 1895 is five hundred dollars for the head of a family and
three hundred dollars for a person who is not the head of a family.
The argument in support of the contention that article III,
section 28 of the constitution of 1895 constitutes a limited and
exclusive grant of legislative power to enact exemption statutes
is twofold. First, article Il, section 28 constitutes a substantial
readoption of article II, section 32 of the constitution of 1868
which had been so interpreted. Second, although the constitution
of 1895 includes a provision in article I, the "Declaration of
Rights," prohibiting imprisonment for debt, this provision con-
tains no grant of a right to reasonable exemptions.55 In Norton v.
Bradham the supreme court had asserted that the exemption
provision of article I, section 20 of the 1868 constitution, if read
in isolation, would constitute a broad grant of legislative author-
ity to enact exemptions. 5 The omission of a similar provision
from the constitution of 1895 supports the view that the current
constitution grants the General Assembly the power to enact only
those exemptions expressly provided for in article III, section 28.
The courts that have confronted the issue have held that
or equity to require that a lien which embraces the homestead and other prop-
erty shall first exhaust the homestead: Provided, Further, That after a home-
stead in lands has been set off and recorded the same shalf not be waived by
deed of conveyance, mortgage or otherwise, unless the same be executed by both
husband and wife, if both be living: Provided, Further, That any person not the
head of a family shall be entitled to a like exemption as provided for the head
of a family in all necessary wearing apparel and tools and implements of trade,
not to exceed in value the sum of three hundred dollars.
53. See note 48 supra.
54. S.C. CONST. art, HI, § 28 (1895).
55. See id. art. I, § 19.
56. See text at notes 44.47 supra.
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article Ill, section 28 limits the power of the legislature to enact
exemption statutes, and that statutes purporting to allow larger
exemptions than those provided for in the constitution are uncon-
stitutional and void. The litigation to date has involved the en-
forceability of South Carolina's life insurance exemption as it
existed prior to its amendment in 1947.11 The issue has arisen in
bankruptcy actions when the trustee of an insured bankrupt
sought to establish title to the cash surrender value of insurance
policies on the insured life under section 70a(5) of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act.5 Section 70a(5) vests the trustee with the bank-
rupt's title to all the nonexempt property that the bankrupt
owned on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. Section 6
of the Bankruptcy Act incorporates state law exemptions.59 Thus,
if the cash surrender value is exempt under state law, the bank-
rupt is entitled to retain the policies free from the trustee's claim
under section 70a(5).
The South Carolina statute was similar to the majority of life
insurance exemption statutes enacted during the latter half of the
nineteenth century." The statute protected the proceeds of a life
insurance policy payable to a married woman or her children from
the claims of creditors of her husband.' Although such statutes
did not specifically exempt the cash surrender value of such a
57. 15 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 865, Act No. 694 (1875). The act pro-
vides:
That a policy of insurance upon the life of any person which has already,
or may hereafter, be taken out, in which it is expressed to be for the benefit of
any married woman, or for the benefit of herself and her children, or for the
benefit of herself and the children of her husband, whether procured by herself
or her husband, shall inure to the use and benefit of the person or persons for
whose use and benefit it is expressed to be taken out; and the sum or net amount
of the insurance becoming due and payable by the terms of the policy shall be
payable to the person or persons for whose use and benefit it shall be expressed
to be taken, free and discharged from the claims of the representatives of the
husband, or of any of his creditors, or any party or parties claiming by, through,
or under him or them, or either of them: Provided, However, That if the prem-
ium paid in any one year, out of the property or funds of the husband, shall
exceed the sum of five hundred dollars, the exemption from the claims of the
creditors of the husband shall not apply to so much of said premium so paid as
shall be in excess of five hundred dollars, but such excess, with the interest
thereon, or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall inure to the benefit of
such creditors, if any: Provided, The same be necessary for their payment.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1976).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
60. See Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United States, 4
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583 (1957).
61. See note 57 supra.
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policy from the claims of the husband's creditors, in order to
preserve the benefits of the policy for the wife and children of the
insured many courts interpreting such statutes did extend the
exemption to cover the cash surrender value."2
Sanders v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 3 was the first case in
which the validity of the South Carolina exemption was called
into question. In Sanders the bankrupt owned a life insurance
policy payable to his wife. On the date of bankruptcy the insur-
ance policy had no cash surrender value. The bankrupt, however,
died prior to the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings. The
trustee asserted that title to the policy vested in him on the date
of bankruptcy and accordingly that he was entitled to the pro-
ceeds of the policy. A majority of the court held that because the
insurance policy lacked a cash surrender value it did not consti-
tute property that passed to the trustee under section 70a.64 Jus-
tice Woods dissented from the opinion of the court. He asserted
that because the bankrupt had retained the right to change the
beneficiary of the policy, that right passed to the trustee. 5 From
this he apparently reasoned that the trustee acquired the right to
designate himself as the beneficiary of the policy. Justice Woods
was thus forced to confront the contention that the insurance
policy was exempt from the claims of the insured's creditors
under the South Carolina exemption statute. Justice Woods re-
butted this contention by asserting that the life insurance exemp-
tion statute was unconstitutional. He stated that the statutory
exemption argument
would be sound if the Constitution of this state did not expressly
forbid that the constitutional exemption to the husband and
wife jointly should not exceed $1,000.00 real estate and $500.00
personal property, which exemption was claimed and allowed.
But for this provision of the Constitution, it would have been
within the legislative power to extend the Constitutional exemp-
tion to include life insurance policies.6
62. See Riesenfeld, supra note 60, at 596-97. See, e.g., Murphy v. Casey, 150 Minn.
107, 184 N.W. 783 (1921); Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 306, 300 S.W. 567
(1927). The South Carolina Supreme Court refused to follow the majority trend and
sidestepped a constitutional attack by holding that the statute exempting the payment
of benefits due under a life insurance policy to a married woman from claims of her
husband's creditors was inapplicable to the cash surrender value of the policy. Wilson v.
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 182 S.C. 131, 188 S.E. 803 (1936).
63. 95 S.C. 36, 78 S.E. 532 (1913).
64. Id. at 41, 78 S.E. at 534.
65. Id. at 46, 78 S.E. at 535.
66. Id. (citation omitted).
656 [Vol. 30
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The issue avoided by the majority in Sanders was presented
directly to the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of South Carolina in In re Cunningham.7 The bankrupt in
Cunningham claimed his five hundred dollar personal property
exemption in his stock of goods and fixtures. Relying upon the
South Carolina statutory exemption the bankrupt also attempted
to exempt certain life insurance policies naming his wife as bene-
ficiary. Unlike the situation in Sanders, the life insurance policies
in issue in Cunningham had a cash surrender value on the date
of bankruptcy. In addressing the issue of whether the bankrupt
could retain the policies free from the claims of the trustee, the
court construed the statute as exempting the cash surrender
value of the policies from the claims of the insured's creditors."
The court, however, then found that the statute as interpreted
was in direct conflict with article HI, section 28 of the constitution
because it granted an exemption in personal property in excess
of five hundred dollars.69 Therefore, the court held the life insur-
ance exemption statute unconstitutional and unenforceable to
protect the cash surrender value of the policies from the claim of
the trustee.70 In reaching its decision the court relied upon the
South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of article II, sec-
tion 32 of the constitution of 1868 as set forth in Duncan v.
Barnett and Norton v. Bradham.71 The court recognized that spe-
cifics of the exemption provisions of the 1868 constitution differed
from those of the provision in the 1895 constitution. Nevertheless,
the court held that these differences did not affect the basic na-
ture of the grant of legislative power. The court asserted, "[Tihe
point is that under both Constitutions the constitutional provi-
sion occupied the whole field or domain of exemptions, and left
nothing to legislative discretion...."I'
Thus, article I, section 28 of the constitution of South Caro-
lina limits the power of the General Assembly to enact exemption
statutes. Specifically, any statute that has the effect of entitling
a debtor to exempt personal property with a value in excess of five
hundred dollars is unconstitutional and unenforceable.
67. 15 F.2d 700 (E.D.S.C. 1926).
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Ill. THE EXEMPTION OF EARNINGS FOR PERSONAL SERVICES
A. The Validity of the Exemption
In 1974 the General Assembly enacted statutes that effec-
tively exempt a debtor's "earnings for personal services" from
postjudgment judicial process in all actions73 and from prejudg-
ment judicial process in actions brought to enforce consumer
credit obligations.74 The issue presented in this section is whether
these 1974 statutes are unconstitutional under the doctrine of
Duncan v. Barnett. The first step in resolving this issue is to
determine whether earnings for personal services are "personal
property" of a debtor that, in the absence of the 1974 statutes,
would be subject to judicial process. Unless earnings for personal
services are property of the debtor that could be subjected to
judicial process, a statute placing earnings beyond the reach of
creditors cannot be an unconstitutional exemption statute.
1. The Scope of "Earnings For Personal Services. "-The
term "earnings for personal services" is broad enough to include
two distinct rights of a debtor. First, the term applies to the
debtor's right to receive earned but unpaid compensation for pre-
viously rendered personal services. Second, the term can be read
to include a debtor's right under an existing employment contract
to receive compensation for services to be rendered in the future.
As discussed below, decisions of the South Carolina Supreme
Court establish that a debtor's right to receive earned but unpaid
compensation for personal services is "property" of the debtor
that, in the absence of an exemption statute, would be subject to
a prejudgment attachment" and a postjudgment order in supple-
mentary proceedings. 5 Statutes exempting this species of "earn-
ings for personal services" are therefore constitutionally suspect.
A debtor's right under an existing employment contract to receive
compensation to be earned in the future is analytically different
from earned but unpaid compensation. Potential rights to
future earnings under an employment contract may be deemed
a chose in action.7 Although the supreme court has held that
73. 1974 S.C. Acts 2879, No. 1241, § 3 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-410 (1976)).
74. Id. § 1-5.104 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-104 (1976)).
75. McKelvay v. South Carolina R.R., 6 S.C. 446 (1876). See text at notes 82-85
infra.
76. Union Bank v. Northrop, 19 S.C. 473 (1883). See text at notes 94-96 infra.
77. Cf. Lynn v. International Bhd. of Firemen and Oilers, 228 S.C. 357, 90 S.E.2d
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certain choses in action are subject to judicial process, 8 the court
might well hold that a debtor's right to receive future compensa-
tion under an executory employment contract is too contingent
to constitute property subject to an attachment or an order in
supplementary proceedings."8 The court could conclude that fu-
ture earnings would be subject to judicial process only if the
General Assembly reenacts a wage garnishment statute. The con-
stitutionality of statutes exempting future earnings therefore will
depend upon the court's characterization of this employment
contract right.
2. Prejudgment Attachment of Earnings.-In addition to
determining whether earnings for personal services are
"property" within the scope of article III, section 28, effective
analysis requires that a distinction be drawn between prejudg-
ment and postjudgment subjection of earnings to judicial process.
Prior to 1974 South Carolina had no statutory provision specifi-
cally regulating prejudgment judicial process against earnings for
personal services. In 1966 the attorney general issued an opinion
asserting that attachment of wages was not authorized under the
garnishment law in effect from 1961 through 1974.0 This opinion
is accurate in that garnishment law was a postjudgment collec-
tion remedy.8' Nevertheless, the opinion is misleading in that it
implies that a debtor's earnings are not subject to attachment. In
McKelvay v. South Carolina Railroad2 the supreme court held
that a debtor's earned but unpaid wages were subject to attach-
ment.3 The McKelvay decision is significant because the court
expressly found that earned but unpaid compensation for per-
sonal services was property within the meaning of the attachment
statute. 4 The court has not addressed the issue of whether a
debtor's contingent right to receive future earnings under an ex-
isting executory employment contract is a property interest sub-
ject to attachment. 5 Thus, prior to 1974 a creditor could attach
78. Id. at 363, 90 S.E.2d at 207.
79. See notes 85 and 96 infra.
80. Op. No. 1969-C, [1966] S.C. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 361.
81. See notes 97-102 and accompanying text infra.
82. 6 S.C. 446 (1876).
83. Id. at 447.
84. Id. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-19-220 (1976) (property subject to attachment).
85. The majority rule is that a debtor's potential right to receive unearned compensa-
tion is too contingent to be subject to attachment. See, e.g., Senna v. Kennedy, 68 Vt.
172, 34 A. 691 (1896); Foster v. Singer, 69 Wis. 392, 34 N.W. 395 (1887). The South
Carolina Supreme Court, however, has given an expansive reading to the term "property"
19791
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a debtor's earned but unpaid compensation, and possibly could
attach a debtor's right under an existing employment contract to
receive compensation for future services.
In 1974 the General Assembly enacted the South Carolina
Consumer Protection Code.8" The Act contains a provision cap-
tioned "No garnishment" that is now codified at section 37-5-
104.87 That section provides that, "[w]ith respect to a debt aris-
ing from a consumer credit sale, a consumer lease, or a consumer
loan, . . . the creditor may not attach unpaid earnings of the
debtor by garnishment or like proceedings." This statute oper-
ates to exempt a debtor's earnings for personal services from judi-
cial process prior to judgment in actions brought to enforce con-
sumer credit obligations. The effect of the statute is to exempt
personal property of a debtor that would otherwise be subject to
attachment under the holding in McKelvay. Presumably, the
statute allows a debtor to claim this exemption of earnings in
addition to the maximum five hundred dollar exemption granted
by article HI, section 28 of the constitution. 9
3. Postjudgment Applications of Earnings.-Since 1870
South Carolina has regulated by statute the application of earn-
ings for personal services toward satisfaction of a judgment. °0 This
statutory regulation has had the effect of providing at least a
partial exemption of earnings for personal service from postjudg-
ment judicial process. Significantly, the provision enacted in 1870
was not an exemption statute. Rather, the provision was included
in South Carolina's adoption of the. Field Code as the "Code of
Procedure for South Carolina."9 The provision defined the prop-
erty of a judgment debtor that a judge in a supplementary pro-
ceeding could order to be applied toward satisfaction of a judg-
ment."2 Specifically, the provision precluded a judge from order-
in section 15-19-220 of the attachment statute. See, e.g., Charles R. Allen, Inc. v. Rhode
Is. Ins. Co., 217 S.C. 296,60 S.E.2d 609 (1950); Williamson v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
54 S.C. 582, 32 S.E. 765 (1898). Therefore, it is not inconceivable that the court would
find that a debtor's right under an executory employment contract to receive compensa-
tion for future services constitutes property subject to attachment.
86. 1974 S.C. Acts 2879, No. 1241 (codified at tit. 37, S.C. CODE ANN. (1976)).
87. Id. § 1-5.104 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 37.-5-104 (1976)).
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-5-104 (1976).
89. See Lanahan & Sons v. Bailey, 53 S.C. 489, 495, 31 S.E. 332, 334 (1898) (Jones,
J., concurring) (exemption referred to in the attachment statute is the homestead exemp-
tion).
90. 14 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 494, Act No. 300, § 323 (1870).
91. See generally H. LIGHTSEY, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA CODE PLEADING 10 (1976).
92. 14 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 494, Act No. 300, § 323 (1870) provided:
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ing the judgment debtor's earnings for personal services to be
applied toward satisfaction of a judgment if the judgment debtor
could establish two prerequisites. 3 First, the judgment debtor
had to establish that the earnings were earned within sixty days
prior to the order in supplementary proceedings. Second, the
judgment debtor had to establish that the earnings were neces-
sary for the use of a family supported by his labor. Unless the
judgment debtor was able to establish both of these prerequisites,
the judge was required to order the application of the judgment
debtor's unpaid earnings for personal services toward satisfaction
of the judgment. In Union Bank v. Northrop' the supreme court
held that an unpaid fee for personal services that the judgment
debtor earned more than sixty days prior to the issuance of an
order in supplementary proceedings could be applied toward sat-
isfaction of the judgment." Although the judgment creditor in
Union Bank did not challenge the validity of the limited statutory
exemption of earnings for personal services, the decision is signifi-
cant because it establishes that earned but unpaid compensation
for personal services is property of a judgment debtor subject to
postjudgment judicial process. Although the court has not consid-
ered the propriety of an order in supplementary proceedings
applying a judgment debtor's rights under an executory employ-
ment contract toward satisfaction of a judgment, an argument
can be advanced that the debtor's rights under such a contract
are property that a judgment creditor can reach in supplementary
proceedings." In any event, earned but unpaid compensation for
The Judge may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from
execution, in the hands either of himself or any other person, or due to the
judgment debtor, to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment; except
that the earnings of the debtor for his personal services, at any time within sixty
days next preceding the order, cannot be so applied when it is made to appear,
by the debtor's affidavit or otherwise, that such earnings are necessary for the
use of a family supported wholly or in part by his labor.
93. Id.
94. 19 S.C. 473 (1883).
95. Id. at 476.
96. In Lynn v. International Bhd. of Firemen and Oilers, 228 S.C. 357, 90 S.E.2d 204
(1955), a creditor recovered a judgment against a parent union. A local of the parent was
operating in South Carolina. Under the constitution of the parent union the local was
under a standing obligation to transfer a portion of each member's monthly dues to the
parent union. The judgment creditor sought an order in supplementary proceedings re-
quiring the local to pay over to the judgment creditor that portion of the dues collected
by the local that the parent was entitled to receive. The supreme court asserted that the
local's obligation to make monthly payments to the parent was a chose in action and
property of the parent union. Therefore, the court held that the judgment creditor was
1979]
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personal services clearly constitutes property that, in the absence
of an exemption statute, could be applied toward satisfaction of
a judgment.
In 1960 and 1961 the General Assembly amended the supple-
mentary proceedings provision to allow limited postjudgment
wage garnishment." Under the statute in effect from 1961
through 1974, a creditor holding a judgment for the balance due
upon food, fuel, or medical accounts could obtain an order gar-
nishing the debtor's "wages, salary, fees, or commissions due or
to become due under any existing contract of employ-
ment .. ."" The amount that could be garnished could not ex-
ceed fifteen percent of the judgment debtor's earnings.99 Further-
more, the maximum amount that could be garnished to enforce
a judgment was limited to one hundred dollars.' Two aspects of
South Carolina's garnishment law are significant. First, under
the garnishment law a debtor's right under an existing employ-
ment contract to earn and receive future compensation was sub-
jected to judicial process. Second, unlike the 1870 statute, under
the garnishment law a judgment creditor could reach earned but
unpaid compensation that was earned within the sixty-day period
preceding the issuance of the order in supplementary proceed-
ings.
Section 2 of the 1974 Act creating the South Carolina Con-
sumer Protection Code amended the supplementary proceedings
entitled to the order he requested. The rationale of Lynn could be applied to the right to
receive future earnings under an executory employment contract if the court is willing to
treat the right as a chose in action. It should be noted, however, that the court in Lynn
stressed that the obligation of the local to the parent union was "not dependent upon any
contingency." Id. at 363, 90 S.E.2d at 207. The obligation was, however, contingent upon
'the local having dues-paying members. Nevertheless, this contingency is perhaps signifi-
cantly smaller than the contingency that an employee will continue to work under an
employment contract that may be terminable at will. Therefore, although a case can be
made for extending the Lynn rationale to a judgment debtor's right to receive future
compensation under an existing employment contract, the court's willingness to adopt
such an extension is debatable.
97. 1961 S.C. Acts 450, No. 265 (repealed 1974); 1960 S.C. Acts 1716, No. 737 (re-
pealed 1961). The 1960 amendment allowed the judge, in his discretion, to order an
amount not exceeding fifteen percent of the debtor's wages be applied to judgments for
balance due on food, fuel or medicine accounts, but no more than one hundred dollars
could be so applied. These provisions were specifically stated as being inapplicable to
judgments for mortgages or for monies lent. The sixty day moratorium period was de-
leted. However, in 1961, this provision was reinserted by amendment and those provisions
regarding judgments for mortgages or monies lent were deleted.
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provision to preclude absolutely the application of a judgment
debtor's earnings for personal services toward satisfaction of a
judgment.'1 Section 15-39-410 now allows a judgment debtor to
withhold from satisfaction of a judgment property that is
"exempt from execution" plus his earnings for personal serv-
ices.'10 Thus, the 1974 Act allows a judgment debtor to claim, in
addition to the five hundred dollar personal property exemption
provided in article III, section 28 of the constitution, the exemp-
tion of all earnings for personal services from application toward
satisfaction of a judgment.
4. Constitutionality of the Exemption of Earnings.-
Although the supreme court has not ruled on the validity of the
1974 statutes exempting a debtor's earnings for personal ser-
vices from judicial process, the statutes cannot pass constitu-
tional muster under the doctrine of Duncan v. Barnett.'03 Deci-
sions of the supreme court establish that a debtor's earned but
unpaid compensation is property of the debtor that would be
subject to judicial process in the absence of a statutory exemp-
tion.10 4 Furthermore, under the case law an argument can be
made that a debtor's right to receive compensation under an
executory employment contract is also property subject to judi-
cial process. 5 The 1974 statutes allow a debtor to exempt his
unpaid earnings for personal services from attachment in actions
to enforce consumer credit obligations and from postjudgment
orders in supplementary proceedings. Thus, the 1974 statutes
grant debtors exemptions in personal property that are in addi-
tion to the maximum five hundred dollar personal property ex-
emption available under article Ill, section 28 of the constitution.
Since the supreme court has consistently held that the General
Assembly lacks the authority to enact exemptions in excess of
those provided for in the constitution,"'0 the 1974 statutes, at least
101. 1974 S.C. Acts 2879, No. 1241, § 3.
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-410 (1976) provides:
The judge may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from
execution, in the hand of either himself or any other person or due to the
judgment debtor, to be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment, except
earnings of the debtor for his personal services cannot be so applied.
103. See text at notes 39-47 supra.
104. Union Bank v. Northrop, 19 S.C. 473 (1883); McKelvay v. South Carolina R.R.,
6 S.C. 446 (1876).
105. See Lynn v. International Bhd. of Firemen and Oilers, 228 S.C. 357, 90 S.E.2d
204 (1955); Charles R. Allen, Inc. v. Rhode Is. Ins. Co., 217 S.C. 296, 60 S.E.2d 609 (1950).
See note 96 supra.
106. See notes 39-47 and accompanying text supra.
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to the extent they exempt unpaid earnings for personal services
from judicial process, are unconstitutional and void.
B. The Impact of Voiding the Statutes that Exempt Earnings
for Personal Services
1. Upon State Collection Remedies.-A conclusive decision
holding unconstitutional the South Carolina statutes that ex-
empt a debtor's earnings for personal services would not subject
the entire amount of a debtor's earnings to judicial process. Fed-
eral law provides substantial protection to the debtor. The Fed-
eral Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968107 limits the amount
of a debtor's earnings for personal services that a creditor can
reach through judicial process to the lesser of twenty-five percent
of the debtor's weekly "disposable earnings"1 8 or the amount by
which the debtor's disposable earnings exceed thirty times. the
federal minimum wage. 09 In effect, this limitation entitles a
debtor to exempt a minimum of $87.00 per week from the reach
of his creditors. When the debtor's disposable earnings exceed
$116.00 per week the debtor is entitled to exempt seventy-five
percent of that amount. 110 The limitations imposed by the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act apply to both prejudgment
collection remedies, such as attachment, and to postjudgment
remedies such as orders in supplementary proceedings."' Fur-
thermore, the limitations apply to actions to enforce all debts
except court orders for support, court orders under Chapter 13 of
the new Bankruptcy Code, and debts for any state or federal
107. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601-1693r (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
108. Disposable earnings are defined at 15 U.S.C. § 1672(b) (1976); "The term
'disposable earnings' means that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after
the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld."
Earnings, in turn, are defined at id. § 1672(a): "The term 'earnings' means compensation
paid or payable for personal services, whether denoininated as wages, salary, commission,
bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement
program." Although the term "earnings" includes pay checks issued to an employee that
are in the possession of his employer, Hodgson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.D.
1973), the term does not include compensation that an employee has received and depos-
ited in his bank account. Dunlap v. First National Bank of Arizona, 399 F. Supp. 855 (D.
Ariz. 1975). See Comment, 9 CREIGHTON L. REv. 761 (1976).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1976).
110. These computations are based upon the federal minimum wage for 1979 of $2.90
per hour. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1) (1978).
111. The statute imposes limitations upon "garnishment." 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)
(1976). Garnishment is defined at 15 U.S.C. § 1672(c): "The term 'garnishment' means
any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required
to be withheld for payment of any debt."
22
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tax.12 Thus, even if the South Carolina statutory exemptions are
declared unconstitutional and void, in most actions debtors will
be entitled to exempt a substantial portion of their earnings for
personal services.
The procedures invoked to reach the nonexempt portion of a
debtor's earnings must also conform to the mandates of federal
law. This requirement poses a substantial problem when a credi-
tor seeks to reach a debtor's earnings prior to judgment. In
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.113 the Supreme Court, of the
United States held that under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment a debtor could not be deprived of the tempo-
rary use of her wages without prior notice and the opportunity for
a hearing."' Although the majority opinion in Sniadach did not
discuss the scope of the required hearing, the concurring opinion
asserted that at the hearing the creditor must be required to
establish at least the probable validity of his underlying claim."
5
Although the Supreme Court has retreated from the due process
standard of prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing an-
nounced in Sniadach for prejudgment collection remedies gener-
ally,16 that standard remains valid when the property subjected
to process consists of the debtor's earnings. 17
112. Id. § 1673(b). For general discussions of garnishment under the Federal Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, see Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 38 U. CiN. L. Rav. 338 (1969); Note,
Wage Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act: An Examinaton of the
Effects on Existing State Law, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 357 (1970); Comment, The Effect
of the Garnishment Provisions of the Consumer Protection Act Upon State Garnishment
Laws, 9 Hous. L. REv. 537 (1972).
In 1977 Congress amended 11 U.S.C. § 1673(b) to impose limitations upon the percen-
tage of debtors' disposable earnings that could be garnished to enforce an order for sup-
port. Pub. L. No. 95-30, Title V, § 501(e), 91 Stat. 161, 162 (1977). When the debtor is
supporting his spouse or dependent child, the maximum part of his weekly disposable
earnings that can be garnished is fifty percent. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673(b)(2)(A) (Cum. Supp.
1979). When the debtor is not supporting his spouse or dependent child, sixty percent of
his weekly disposable earnings is subject to garnishment. Id. § 1673(b)(2)(B). These limi-
tations are increased to fifty-five percent and sixty-five percent respectively when the
support order is with respect to a period more than twelve weeks prior to commencement
of the workweek for which garnishment is sought.
113. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
114. Id. at 339.
115. Id. at 342-43 (Harlan, J., concurring).
116. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitch-
ell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
117. In both North Georgia and Mitchell the Court distinguished rather than over-
ruled Sniadach. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 605-07 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 614-20 (1974).
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The South Carolina Supreme Court has held a creditor may
reach a debtor's unpaid earnings under the attachment stat-
utes."' The attachment statute, however, makes no provision for
affording the debtor notice and an opportunity for a hearing be-
fore he is deprived of the use of his property."' Thus an applica-
tion of the attachment statute to reach a debtor's earnings would
violate the due process clause.' 20 A creditor might be able to cir-
cumvent the due process problems by serving the debtor with an
order to show cause why his earnings should not be attached at
the same time he served his summons and complaint. Under a
show cause procedure the debtor could obtain a probable validity
hearing before the attachment of his earnings could become effec-
tive. In Rogoski v. Hammond'2' a Washington appellate court
endorsed a trial court's use of the show cause procedure to com-
pensate for the omission from the State's attachment statute of
a provision for a preseizure hearing.' 2 In Rogoski the court was
aided in making its decision by a Washington statute that author-
ized the trial court to adopt any mode of proceeding that appears
to conform best to the spirit of the laws when the course of pro-
ceeding is not specified by statute.'1 Since South Carolina does
not have a statute similar to Washington's, the adoption of a
show cause procedure by the South Carolina courts appears
doubtful. If applied as written the South Carolina attachment
statute does not allow a constitutional attachment of a debtor's
118. McKelvay v. South Carolina R.R., 6 S.C. 446 (1876).
119. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-19-10 to -560 (1976). Section 15-19-110 provides for issu-
ance of a warrant of attachment upon the filing of an affidavit, id. §§ 15-19-50, -60 and
bond, id. §§ 15-19-80, -90.
120. The South Carolina attachment statute may be unconstitutional as applied to
any type of property. In both Mitchell andNorth Georgia the majority opinions imply that
the issuance of the writ by a judge is a prerequisite to finding constitutional a state
prejudgment collection remedy that does not afford the debtor an opportunity for a presei-
zure hearing. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 606; Mitch-
ell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. at 606-07. The South Carolina attachment statute authorizes
a clerk of court to issue the writ of attachment. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-19-40 (1976). Two
United States courts of appeals decisions have held attachment statutes unconstitutional
on the ground that the writ was issued by a clerk of court rather than a judge. Johnson
v. American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1978); Guzman v. Western State
Bank, 516 F.2d 125, 130-31, 133 (8th Cir. 1975). No reported decision has yet considered
such an attack on South Carolina's attachment statute. But see Harrison v. Morris, 370
F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974) (upheld constitutionality of the attachment statute by distin-
guishing Fuentes and Sniadach through a novel interpretation of takings under the due
process clause).
121. 9 Wash. App. 500, 513 P.2d 285 (1973).
122. Id. at 504-13, 513 P.2d at 288-93.
123. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.28.150 (1961).
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nonexempt earnings. Thus, although a portion of a debtor's earn-
ings may not be legally exempt from prejudgment collection rem-
edies, the debtor may in fact enjoy an absolute exemption prior
to judgment because no procedure is available to a creditor under
which he can reach a debtor's earnings.
For postjudgment collection remedies, there is no due process
requirement that would interfere with a court's power in supple-
mentary proceedings to order an employer to turn over the nonex-
empt portion of a judgment debtor's earned but unpaid compen-
sation to the judgment creditor. ' Furthermore, a court could
accept the rationale suggested by the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Lynn v. International Brotherhood of Firemen and
Oilers'1 and hold that the judgment debtor's right under his em-
ployment contract to receive nonexempt earnings is intangible
property that may be applied toward satisfaction of a judg-
ment. 2 The court could then order that the proceeds of this right
be turned over to the judgment creditor. The effect of adopting
the rationale of Lynn would be to impose wage garnishment. The
order in supplementary proceedings would effectively grant the
judgment creditor a lien upon all after-acquired nonexempt earn-
ings of the debtor in an amount equal to the judgment debt. The
judgment creditor's lien would attach to future compensation
when it was earned and would be enforced when the compensa-
tion became payable to the debtor. If the South Carolina courts
refuse to adopt the procedure suggested in Lynn, a judgment
creditor would have to make repeated requests for orders immedi-
ately prior to the end of each pay period of the debtor requiring
the debtor's employer to turn over the nonexempt portion of the
judgment debtor's earned but unpaid compensation. Although
this latter approach is more cumbersome than wage garnishment
established under the rationale of Lynn, it would allow a judg-
ment creditor to apply a debtor's future earnings toward satisfac-
tion of a judgment. In short, voiding the South Carolina earnings
exemption statutes is likely to have a significant impact in the
enforcement of judgments.
124. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285 (1924); Brown
v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355, 1363 (5th Cir. 1976). But see Alderman, Default
Judgments and Postjudgment Remedies Meet the Constitution: Sniadach and its
Progeny, 65 GEO. L.J. 1 (1976).
125. 228 S.C. 357, 90 S.E.2d 204 (1955).
126. Id. at 363, 90 S.E.2d at 206-07 (obligation of local union to pay dues to parent
union is chose in action and attachable property of the parent). See note 96 supra.
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2. Upon Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings. -This section
examines the relationship between subjecting earnings to judicial
process and consumer bankruptcies. Empirical studies establish
that the rate of consumer bankruptcies is higher in states where
a debtor's earnings for personal services are subject to judicial
process than in states where such earnings are exempt.'2 These
studies strongly suggest a causal relationship between "wage gar-
nishment" and consumer bankruptcy. Although the rate of con-
sumer bankruptcies in South Carolina is currently among the
lowest in the nation, 128 the empirical studies suggest that if the
South Carolina statutory exemption of earnings for personal ser-
vices is declared unconstitutional an increase in consumer bank-
ruptcies would result.
The causal relationship between subjecting earnings for
personal services to judicial process and consumer bankruptcies
arises because a consumer can free his future earnings from the
claims of his existing creditors by filing a petition in bankruptcy.
The ability to free future earnings from the claims of his creditors
may provide a substantial incentive to a consumer to file in bank-
ruptcy. In essence, filing a petition in bankruptcy enables a con-
sumer to exempt property, future earnings, that are not exempt
under state law.
Section 70a is the provision of the current Bankruptcy Act
that entitles the bankrupt to retain his future wages free from the
claim of his prebankruptcy creditors.'29 Section 70a establishes
127. See, e.g., D. STANLEY & M. GmTH, BANKRUPTCY: PRoBLEm, PRocEss, REFORM 28-
32, 236-41 (1971); Shuchman & Jantscher, Effects of the Federal Minimum Exemption
from Wage Garnishment on Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Rates, 77 COM. L.J. 360 (1972).
Other factors play in the equation. For a study that considered the effects of the
unemployment rate, consumer debt as a percentage of personal income, wage garnish-
ment, and exemptions, see Apilado, Dauten & Smith, Personal Bankruptcies, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371 (1978). Of these four, wage garnishment was found to be the most significant.
Id. at 380. The authors concluded, however, "that other explanatory variables have yet
to be identified." Id. at 391.
128. See [1977] ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNrrED STATES COURTS 464-71. For a comparison with other states from 1962-74 which
ranked South Carolina as having the lowest bankruptcy rate, see Apilado, Dauten &
Smith, supra note 127, at 375-76 (1978). During that period South Carolina never ranked
higher than forty-sixth, and was fiftieth for seven years. Id. at 392. That South Carolina's
wage garnishment statute in effect from 1960 to 1974 did not generate a higher rate of
consumer bankruptcies may result from the narrow class of obligations (judgments on
food, fuel, and medical accounts) that could be enforced by garnishment, and the limited
amount that could be garnished ($100 per judgment). See notes 97-100 and accompanying
text supra.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976).
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the date of filing the petition as the date of "cleavage. ' ' 31 That
provision vests the trustee with the bankrupt's title to all nonex-
empt property falling within the scope of one of the eight subsec-
tions of section 70a that the bankrupt owned "as of the date of
filing the petition.""'3 This property must be turned over to the
trustee for liquidation and the proceeds are distributed to those
creditors of the bankrupt who have established allowable
claims.'3 2 Subject to the windfall clauses of section 70a, 33 how-
ever, the bankrupt may retain all property he acquires after filing
the petition, free from the reach of his prior creditors holding
dischargeable claims.'1 Thus, the bankrupt can retain the com-
pensation for personal services that he earns after filing the peti-
tion free from the claims of his trustee and his prebankruptcy
creditors holding dischargeable debts.' When such creditors
have begun or threatened to begin subjecting the nonexempt por-
tion of a debtor's earned but unpaid compensation to judicial
process, filing a bankruptcy petition will prevent the creditors
from reaching any portion of the debtor's postbankruptcy earn-
ings.
The analysis is more complex when a creditor has obtained
a garnishment that under state law has the effect of establishing
a lien upon the debtor's future earnings. State law liens are nor-
mally enforceable in bankruptcy proceedings unless subject to
one of the trustee's avoiding powers. 36 Nevertheless, when a gar-
nishment lien is not voidable by the trustee, the doctrine of Local
Loan Company v. Hunt137 protects the bankrupt's postbank-
ruptcy earnings from the valid state law lien of a garnishing credi-
130. See Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268, 276 (1915); Everett v. Jud-
son, 228 U.S. 474, 479 (1913).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976).
132. See id. § 105(a). See also Bankruptcy Act § 57, 11 U.S.C. § 93 (1976) (allowable
claims).
133. The windfall clauses vest the trustee with the title the bankrupt acquires in
contingent remainders, "like interests in real property," estates by the entirety that vest
within the six month period after filing the petition, and property the bankrupt receives
"by bequest, devise or inheritance" within the six month period. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(7)
(1976) and the paragraph following id. § 110(a)(8) (1976).
134. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1966). See generally 1A J. MOORE,
J. MuLDR & R. OGLERAY, CoLma ON BANKRupTC 17.30 (J. Moore & L. King ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as CoLamR]. See also Bankruptcy Act §§ 14, 17, 11 U.S.C. §§ 32, 35
(1976) (dischargeability).
135. See IA & 4A CoLLIER, supra note 134, at 17.30, 70.34.
136. See Zartman v. First National Bank, 216 U.S. 134, 138 (1910); Carina Mercury,
Inc. v. Igaravides, 344 F.2d 397, 399-400 (1st Cir. 1965).
137. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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tor. In Local Loan the Supreme Court ruled that an assignment
of wages to secure a dischargeable debt could not be enforced
against wages earned after the filing of the petition.3 ' The Court
found that such a holding was necessary to preserve the benefit
of the bankrupt's discharge and afford him a fresh start in life.'39
The doctrine announced in Local Loan for assignments of wages
applies with equal force to wage garnishments. 0 Thus, a garnish-
ment issued to enforce a dischargeable debt, which under state
law imposes a lien upon a debtor's future earnings, does not bind
the debtor's compensation earned after filing a petition in bank-
ruptcy.
The analysis under the new Bankruptcy Code"' is similar.
Section 541 defines the property of the bankrupt estate that will
be liquidated and distributed to creditors with allowable
claims.' Section 541(a)(6) excludes from the estate, "earnings
from services performed by an individual debtor after commence-
ment of the case. 143 Furthermore, nothing in the Code purports
to repudiate the doctrine of Local Loan. Therefore, a consumer
can free his future earnings from the grip of a garnishment lien
by filing in bankruptcy. The date of cleavage concept of bank-
ruptcy law thus provides the debtor whose earnings have been
subjected to judicial process with an incentive to file in straight
bankruptcy.
Although the impact of this incentive is difficult to quantify,
in many cases, it will be substantial. A consumer whose financial
condition is such that his creditors have resorted to judicial pro-
cess to reach his earnings will most likely need his entire earnings
to retain and acquire necessities for the well-being of himself and
his family. For example, the loss of even twenty-five percent of
his earnings may prevent the consumer from meeting such cur-
rent obligations as his rent. Default on this obligation will result
in the consumer being evicted from his residence. If, by filing
bankruptcy, the consumer can free his future earnings from the
claim of his creditors and thereby retain his residence, the incen-
tive to file in bankruptcy will be strong.
In order to determine whether this incentive will actually
138. Id. at 242-44.
139. Id. at 244-45.
140. See Hodgson v. Bicknell, 49 Wash. 2d 130, 298 P.2d 844 (1956).
141. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11.
142. Id. § 541.
143. Id. § 541(a)(6).
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induce consumer bankruptcies, one must assess the disincentives
to filing in bankruptcy. The principal disincentive to filing in
straight bankruptcy is that the debtor must surrender all his
nonexempt property to the trustee.' In theory this disincentive
should have no impact upon the decision to file in bankruptcy of
a debtor whose earnings have been subjected to judicial prcess.
Under South Carolina law, a judgment creditor would be able to
reach a debtor's earnings only through supplementary proceed-
ings. 45 One condition for instituting supplementary proceedings
is that the judgment creditor must have issued an execution that
was returned unsatisfied. '46 Thus, before a judgment creditor can
obtain an order applying the debtor's earnings toward satisfac-
tion of a judgment he must have exhausted all nonexempt prop-
erty in the debtor's possession." If the debtor owned assets not
in his possession, such as a bank account, the judgment creditor
would probably apply those assets toward satisfaction of the judg-
ment before resorting to the judgment debtor's earnings. The
debtor, therefore, will have lost all his nonexempt property before
the judgment creditor subjects the debtor's earnings to judicial
process. Furthermore, the exemptions that a debtor is entitled to
claim in bankruptcy are at least as large as those he claimed
under South Carolina law prior to the institution of supplemen-
tary proceedings. ' Thus, in theory a consumer whose earnings
have been subjected to judicial process will not own property
which must be surrendered to the trustee upon filing in bank-
ruptcy.
The theoretical result outlined above, however, rests upon
the assumption that state law collection remedies against a judg-
ment debtor's property are as efficient as the trustee's remedies
in bankruptcy. If this assumption is false, then loss of property
may be a disincentive to filing in bankruptcy. If state collection
144. Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976); Bankruptcy Code, supra note
11, § 542.
145. A debtor's earned but unpaid compensation is a debt owing to the debtor. A
judgment creditor cannot reach an indebtedness owing to the judgment debtor through
execution; he must invoke supplementary proceedings. McManus v. Bank of Greenwood,
171 S.C. 84, 88-89, 171 S.E. 473, 474 (1933) (code of procedure does not provide for levy
on choses in action such as bank accounts). See generally John Deere Co. v. Cone, 239
S.C. 597, 603-04, 124 S.E.2d 50, 53 (1962).
146. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-310 (1976).
147. See id. § 15-39-80 (contents of executions).
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remedies are inefficient a judgment debtor may be able to retain
free from the claims of his judgment creditors nonexempt prop-
erty which upon filing a petition in bankruptcy the debtor would
be forced to turn over to the trustee. If a judgment debtor can
retain nonexempt property under state law collection actions, a
disincentive to file in bankruptcy will arise.149 Therefore, one can-
not determine the impact upon voluntary consumer bankruptcies
of subjecting judgment debtors' earnings for personal services to
judicial process without first determining whether other state law
collection remedies enable a judgment creditor to reach all a
judgment debtor's nonexempt property. The impact of subjecting
judgment debtors' earnings for personal services to judicial pro-
cess upon the rate of voluntary consumer bankruptcies should
vary directly with the efficiency of other state law collection rem-
edies. The greater the efficiency of these other remedies, the
higher the probability that a subjection of earnings for personal
services to judicial process will force a debtor to file in bank-
ruptcy.
Furthermore, there are disincentives to filing in bankruptcy
in addition to the loss of nonexempt property. Many consumer
debtors may refrain from filing because of the stigma of bank-
ruptcy. ' Although in recent years the courts
' and Congress152
have attempted to limit the collateral injuries a debtor suffers as
a result of filing in bankruptcy, bankruptcy may still have a
profound negative impact upon a debtor's future employment
and social standing."3 The stigma of bankruptcy may cause a
debtor to endure, if possible, the economic pressure imposed upon
149. This situation, however, will create an incentive for creditors of a debtor to file
an involuntary petition against him. For the view that limiting a debtor to smaller exemp-
tions in a bankruptcy proceeding than available under state law would create an incentive
for creditors to file involuntary petitions, see Donnelly, The New (Proposed?) Bankruptcy
Act: The Development of Its Structural Provisions and Their Impact on the Interests of
Consumer-Debtors, 18 SANTA CLAA L. Rav. 291, 304-08 (1978).
150. See 1 D. CowANs, Bm upray LAw AND PRACTICE § 48 (2d ed. 1978),
151. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (state cannot suspend driver's license
for failure to satisfy debt discharged in bankruptcy); Handsome v. Rutgers Univ., 445 F.
Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978) (violates fresh start policy for a public university to deny tran-
scripts for nonpayment of discharged student loan); Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11,
§ 523(a)(8), (b). But see Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977)
(private college can refuse transcripts to those not paying student loans discharged in
bankruptcy). See generally Comment, Post Discharge Coercion of Bankrupts by Private
Creditors: Girardier v. Webster College, 91 HARv. L. Ray. 1336 (1978).
152. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 525 (protection against discriminatory treat-
ment).
153. See generally 1 D. CowANs, supra note 150 at § 52.
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him by subjecting his earnings to judicial process, and to refrain
from filing in bankruptcy.
Thus, allowing judgment creditors to subject a debtor's earn-
ings to judicial process will create an incentive to file consumer
bankruptcies. The strength of this incentive may be substantial.
Furthermore, it is probable that this incentive will be sufficiently
strong to induce a higher rate of consumer bankruptcies in South
Carolina.
IV. EXEMPTONS UNDER THE BANKRuPTcY REFORM ACT OF 1978
A. Impediments to the Fresh Start
On November 6, 1978 the President signed the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.54 This Act represents the culmination of
nearly a decade of congressional activity in the area of bank-
ruptcy reform. 5 Title I of the Reform Act consists of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 56 The Bankruptcy Code represents a significant ref-
ormation and a complete restructuring of the substantive law of
bankruptcy now contained in the Bankruptcy Act.'57 The Bank-
ruptcy Code will apply to all cases commenced after September
30, 1979.111 Among the most significant reforms effected by the
Bankruptcy Code are those in the area of consumer bankruptcies.
With respect to liquidation proceedings the Bankruptcy Code was
drafted to insure that debtors would realize the principle benefit
of straight bankruptcy-the opportunity to obtain a fresh start in
life. The constitutional limitations imposed upon the power of the
General Assembly to enact exemption statutes may impede the
effectiveness of the Code in accomplishing this purpose.
Congre'ss concluded that the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act were not operating to allow debtors to obtain a "fresh start
in life."'59 Two prerequisites must be met to provide a debtor with
a fresh start in life. First, the debtor must be granted an effective
release from personal liability for the debts he incurred prior to
filing his petition. 60 Second, the debtor must be entitled to retain
sufficient property for a return to normal life. 61 Although the
154. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
155. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 2-3.
156. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11.
157. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
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current Bankruptcy Act contains provisions entitling a bankrupt
individual to a discharge of personal liability for his prebank-
ruptcy debts6 ' and reserving to him property exempt under state
law, '6 the drafters of the new Code found the Act deficient in
meeting both of the prerequisites to a fresh start."4 One reason
for this finding is -that the Bankruptcy Act incorporates state
exemption statutes, and that these statutes "are outmoded, de-
signed for more rural times, and hopelessly inadequate to serve
the needs of and provide a fresh start for modem urban debt-
ors.)' 165 The principal reason, however, is that the Bankruptcy Act
does not make adequate provision for consumer credit secured by
security interests in essential consumer goods."' A discharge re-
leases the bankrupt from personal liability for his secured debts,
but it does not affect the validity of a security interest the creditor
may hold upon the bankrupt's property."7 Under the law of most
states including South Carolina, a debtor can waive an exemption
in the security agreement."' Consumer credit is frequently ex-
tended pursuant to a security agreement under which the con-
sumer grants the creditor a security interest in essential consumer
goods and waives his exemption rights. 6' Upon the consumer's
subsequent bankruptcy neither his discharge nor the exemption
of the goods under state law will prevent the secured creditor from
enforcing its security interest by repossessing the goods. Thus,
despite the exemption and discharge, secured consumer credit
can operate to deprive a bankrupt of goods that are essential to
his fresh start in life.
The problems posed by secured consumer credit are more
complex, however, than the description above would indicate.
Furthermore, a secured creditor confronted with the default and
bankruptcy of his debtor may invoke less direct and more invidi-
162. Bankruptcy Act § 14, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1976).
163. Id. § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
164. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 125.
165. Id. at 126.
166. Id. at 125, 127.
167. See generally 1A COLLIER, supra note 134, at T 17.29.
168. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-120 (1976) (waiver of homestead exemption). See
generally Vukowich, supra note 1, at 848-52 (1974); FTC, REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFI-
CER ON PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE: CREDIT PRACTmCES, 16 CFR 444 98-114 (1978)
[hereinafter FTC REPORT]; Student Symposium, Prohibiting Advance Contractual
Waivers of the Benefits of State Property Exemptions Laws: § 444.2(a)(2) of the Proposed
FTC Rule on Credit Practices, 8 CONN. L. REv. 503 (1976).
169. See FTC REPORT, supra note 168, at 110-12; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note
3, at 127, 172.
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ous methods to defeat the bankrupt's ability to obtain a fresh
start than by merely repossessing the bankrupt's exempt con-
sumer goods. 7 '
A creditor with a security interest in consumer goods may not
be fully secured within the traditional definition of the term.' A
creditor is fully secured when he has a contractual right upon the
debtor's default to seize and sell specified property of the debtor
sufficient to generate a fund that will satisfy the underlying obli-
gation. 12 When a creditor's collateral is consumer goods it is
likely that the resale value of the goods will be less than the
amount of the underlying debt. 3 Leaving aside the not atypical
situation in which the consumer purchases goods at a grossly
inflated price under a secured credit arrangement, 74 two factors
contribute to the lack of security. First, most consumer goods
tend to depreciate more rapidly than the debtor reduces the
amount of the secured debt.' Second, there may be no viable
market in which to sell used and repossessed consumer goods.
76
That the creditor with a security interest in consumer goods may
be at least partially unsecured does not mean that the creditor
lacks the ability upon the consumer's default to enforce the obli-
gation.'77 Although the collateral may have a minimal resale
value, the cost to the consumer of replacing the goods may be
substantial. In addition, if the goods are essential to the con-
sumer's well-being the consumer may be willing to enter into
repeated refinancing agreements to avert repossession.7 8 A se-
cured creditor, therefore, may effectively use threats of reposses-
sion to extract from the debtor payments that far exceed the
resale value of the collateral." The value to the secured creditor
of his security interest in consumer goods may be found primarily
in the leverage it gives him to extract payments from the
debtor."0
In the context of bankruptcy, the leverage available to the
170. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 127.
171. Id. at 162-64, 166-73.
172. See id. at 180-81.
173. Id. at 166, 171-73.
174. See D. CAPLOVrrZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 16-20, 81-93 (2d ed. 1967).
175. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 171.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 172.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 127.
180. Id. at 172.
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secured creditor with a security interest in consumer goods ap-
pears in the form of reaffirmation agreements."8 ' A reaffirmation
agreement is a promise by the debtor to pay a debt that is subject
to the debtor's discharge. ' Reaffirmation agreements can arise
whenever the bankrupt estate does not have an interest in the
goods. Two such situations typically arise in consumer bankrupt-
cies. First, if the value of the goods subject to a valid security
interest is less than the amount of the secured debt, the debtor
and hence the estate has no interest in the goods. In this situation
the trustee abandons the goods and allows the secured creditor
to enforce his security interest outside the bankruptcy proceed-
ings.' 3 The second situation arises when the goods subject to the
security interest are exempt under state law.s The debtor may
have an equity in the goods, but that equity is reserved to the
debtor and cannot be applied toward satisfaction of the claims of
the unsecured creditois. Under existing law exempt property is
not part of the bankrupt estate.'" Therefore, the trustee will allow
the debtor to retain exempt consumer goods. The secured creditor
can then enforce its security interest outside the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. In either situation, the debtor invariably will be in de-
fault under the terms of the agreement, 8 ' and the secured creditor
will have the right to take possession of the collateral, sell it, and
apply the proceeds toward satisfaction of the security interest."7
When the amount of the debt exceeds the market value of the
collateral or when the replacement cost to the -consumer exceeds
the amount of the unpaid debt, the secured creditor may eschew
the direct enforcement of its security interest and propose a reaf-
firmation agreement. In a typical reaffirmation agreement, the
secured party agrees to refrain from exercising his right to take
181. Id. See generally 2 D. CowANs, supra note 150, at § 654.
182. See 2 D. CowANs, supra note 150, at § 654.
183. BANKRuprCY R. 608; Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 554. See generally 1 D.
COWANS, supra note 150, at § 377.
184. COMMISSION ON THE BANKRurcy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPoirr OF THE
COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. Pt. I 174 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BANKRuPTc COMMISSION REPORT].
185. Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976) (exempt property does not vest
in trustee). See generally 2 D. CowANs, supra note 150, at §§ 694-95.
186. Even if the debtor has not missed an installment payment, the security agree-
ment will provide that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by or against him will
constitute a default. Presumably such a term would be enforceable under S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 37-5-109(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978) because bankruptcy will significantly impair the secured
party's prospect for payment.
187. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-501, -503 to -505, 37-5-103 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
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possession of the collateral in exchange for the bankrupt's prom-
ise to pay the original debt. 88 The proposed reaffirmation agree-
ment may be attractive to the bankrupt because the goods are
essential to his and his dependents' well-being and the replace-
ment cost of the goods may exceed the amounts called for under
the reaffirmation agreement. The reaffirmation agreement, how-
ever, subverts the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Act, be-
cause the bankrupt remains personally liable for a prebankruptcy
debt.' 2 The bankrupt, thus, loses the benefit of his discharge of
the underlying debt.
In summary, two aspects of practice under the current Bank-
ruptcy Act impede a consumer bankrupt from obtaining the fresh
start in life contemplated by the Act. First, in many instances the
state law exemptions applicable in a bankruptcy proceeding
under section 6 of the Act are inadequate to protect property
essential to the well-being of the debtor. Second, the Act affords
minimal relief to the consumer bankrupt whose essential property
is encumbered by valid security interests: More specifically, the
Act does not control the creation of reaffirmation agreements that
a partially secured creditor can impose upon a bankrupt through
threats of repossession.
B. The Bankruptcy Code-Attempts at Reform and Incentives
to Liquidate
The Bankruptcy Code includes provisions designed to correct
these perceived deficiencies under the current Act. First, the
Code includes a provision that may operate to allow a consumer
debtor to claim exemptions enumerated in the Code that are
more generous and more in conformity with the needs of con-
sumer debtors than exemptions available under South Carolina
law. 190 By providing for federal exemptions Congress sought to
allow a debtor to retain sufficient property to enable the debtor
to returp to normal life.19 Second, the Code includes provisions
designed to preclude the secured credit problems that under the
current Act may prevent a consumer bankrupt from realizing the
benefit of his discharge.
192
188. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 163, 170.
189. Id. at 162-64.
190. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, §§ 522(b)(1), 522(d).
191. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 126-27.
192. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, §§ 522(f), 524, 525, 722.
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act is substantially the enactment
of H.R. 8200 as it was passed by the House of Representatives."'
H.R. 8200 set forth a comprehensive and integrated statutory
scheme designed to assure that straight bankruptcy would oper-
ate to grant a consumer a fresh start in life.'94 Although the Bank-
ruptcy Code includes most of the statutory scheme set forth in
H.R. 8200, the House was forced to compromise one crucial provi-
sion to gain Senate approval."5 Under H.R. 8200 an individual
debtor was given an absolute right to elect to claim liberal
"federal exemptions" in a bankruptcy proceeding in lieu of the
exemptions available under state law."' Under the Bankruptcy
Code as enacted each state has the right to enact specific legisla-
tion to deprive debtors of the right to claim the federal exemp-
tions. 7 The effect of enacting such legislation will be to limit
bankrupt debtors to the exemptions available under state law
and nonbankruptcy federal law.'
The issue now raised is whether the General Assembly should
enact legislation to deprive South Carolina debtors of the right
to claim federal exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings. In order
to assess the advisability of enacting such legislation several fac-
tors must be considered. First, one must determine the probable
impact upon the rate of consumer bankruptcies in South Carolina
of allowing debtors to claim the federal exemptions, Second, one
must determine whether depriving debtors of their right to claim
the federal exemptions will frustrate the fundamental objective
of the Reform Act as it applies to consumer liquida-
tions-assuring the debtor of the opportunity to obtain a fresh
start in life. Specifically, one must determine whether depriving
debtors of the right to claim the federal exemptions will undercut
the effectiveness of the provisions of the Code designed to cure the
secured credit problem. Finally, one must consider the advisabil-
ity and availability of alternative courses of action.
1. Impact on the Rate of Bankruptcies.-A strong argu-
ment supports the General Assembly's enacting legislation to
deprive debtors of the right to claim the federal exemptions enu-
193. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
194. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 125.
195. See 124 CONG. REC. H11,089 (Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); 124
CONG. REc. S17,406 (Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Deconcini).
196. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Title I, § 522(b).
197. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 522(b)(1).
198. Id. at § 522(b)(2).
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merated in section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. Should the
General Assembly fail to enact such legislation a great disparity
would arise between the amount of property a debtor could ex-
empt from the claims of his creditors under state law and the
amount he could exempt from claims of the trustee as a repre-
sentative of the creditors in bankruptcy. This disparity would
create an incentive to file in bankruptcy. To illustrate the size of
the disparity consider the following comparison. Under South
Carolina law the head of a family can exempt a real estate inter-
est worth $1,000.'11 Under section 522(d) any debtor can exempt
his equity in real or personal property that he uses as a residence
in an amount up to $7,500.2o1 If a husband and wife are joint
debtors, the maximum exemption in real estate available to them
under South Carolina law is $1,000.o1° If the husband and wife file
a joint petition in bankruptcy, section 522(m) entitles them to
exempt their equity in their residence in an amount up to
$15,000.o2 With respect to personal property, the maximum ex-
emption available to a debtor under South Carolina law is prop-
erty with a value of $500.203 In a bankruptcy proceeding, under
section 522(d) a debtor is entitled to exempt his equity in an
automobile up to $1,200,04 in any item of household furnishings,
household goods, wearing apparel, or appliances up to an amount
of $200 per item with no aggregate limitation,"'s his equity in the
tools for his trade up to $750,208 and much much more." ' Under
state law consumer debtors are entitled to exempt a maximum
of $1,500 from the claims of their unsecured creditors. In bank-
ruptcy proceedings, however, section 522(d) will enable most con-
sumers to exempt all or virtually all of their property from the
claims of the trustee as the representative of their unsecured
creditors.
The ability to obtain increased exemptions would provide
199. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-10 (1976).
200. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 522(d)(1).
201. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-410 (1976).
202. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, §§ 522(d)(1), 522(m).
203. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-310 (1976).
204. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 522(d)(2).
205. Id. § 522(d)(3).
206. Id. § 522(d)(6).
207. See, e.g., id. § 522(d)(4) (jewelry, $500); id. § 522(d)(8) (loan value of certain
life insurance policies, $4,000); id. § 522(d)(10)(D) (the right to receive alimony, support,
or separate maintenance, to the extent "necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor").
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consumers a significant incentive to file for liquidation."' Fur-
thermore, since bankruptcy entitles a debtor to a discharge re-
leasing him from personal liability for his prebankruptcy debts,59
and enables him to acquire property after filing free from the
claims of his prior creditors,21 granting the exemptions enumer-
ated in section 522(d) may render the inducement to file in bank-
ruptcy irresistible to any consumer residing in this state who is
pressed by his creditors. Thus, one result of enacting legislation
to deprive debtors of the right to claim the federal exemptions
would be to eliminate a significant incentive to file consumer
bankruptcies.211 By eliminating this incentive, the General As-
sembly may forestall a marked increase in the number of con-
sumer liquidation proceedings filed under the new Code.
2. State Exemptions v. Federal Objectives.-Before en-
dorsing such legislation, one must examine the impact that the
legislation would have upon the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code designed to cure the secured credit problem. The secured
credit problem in consumer bankruptcies under the current Act,
as identified above, is that a creditor with a security interest in
consumer goods can use that security interest as a leverage device
to force a bankrupt consumer to reaffirm a debt discharged in the
bankruptcy proceeding.21 2 The reaffirmation agreement has the
effect of depriving the bankrupt of the benefit of his discharge,
and thus of his fresh start in life.23 The Bankruptcy Code attacks
the secured credit problem on two levels. First, the Code contains
provisions that limit the enforceability in bankruptcy proceed-
ings of security interests in consumer goods.21 Second, the Code
imposes rigorous procedural and substantive conditions upon a
creditor's right to bind a debtor to an enforceable agreement to
208. Commentators have recognized that the ability to obtain increased exemptions
may provide an incentive to file in bankruptcy. See UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACr, Prefatory
Note at 1, reprinted in 13 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1979).
209. Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1976); Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11,
§ 727.
210. Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976); Bankruptcy Code, supra note
11, § 541.
211. For the view that state exemptions should be larger than those under bank-
ruptcy, see Comment, Personal Property Exemptions and the Uniform Exemptions Act,
1978 B.Y.U.L. REv. 462, 464.
212. See text at notes 168-89 supra.
213. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 162-64.
214. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 522(f)(2) (avoidance of nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interests), § 722 (redemption).
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reaffirm a discharged debt.25 Since the exemption provisions di-
rectly affect only the first level of attack, the discussion herein
will focus upon those provisions limiting the enforceability of
security interests in consumer goods.
Two provisions of the Code limit the enforceability of secu-
rity interests in consumer goods. These limitations are, however,
connected with and in large part dependent upon the exemption
of the consumer goods under section 522. Section 522(f)(2) pro-
vides that the debtor may avoid nonpossessory nonpurchase-
money security interests in specified types of personal property.
28
The types of personal property specified are all included in the
enumeration of exemptions set forth in section 522(d).27 Included
among the types of property to which the avoiding power of sec-
tion 522(f)(2) applies are items that are essential to the debtor's
well-being, including: household furnishings, wearing apparel,
appliances, implements of the debtor's trade, and professionally
215. Id. § 524(c)-(d). For a discussion of reaffirmations covering the FTC's role, the
Bankruptcy Code revisions, and statistics on reaffirmations, see Student Symposium,
Reaffirmation of Debts Discharged in Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study of an Area of
Potential FTC Regulation, 8 CONN. L. Rav. 519 (1976).
216. Bankruptcy Code § 522(f)(2) provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of
a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs
an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection
(b) of this section, if such lien is-
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appli-
ances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are
held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor
or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor.
217. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 522(d)(3) provides that a debtor may exempt
"[tihe debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any particular item, in house-
hold furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or
musical instruments, that are held primarily for the personal, family or household use of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor." Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(4) provides that a
debtor may exempt "[t]he debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $500 in value in
jewelry held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a depen-
dent of the debtor." Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(6) provides that a debtor may exempt
"[tihe debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in any implements, pro-
fessional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the
debtor." Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(9) provides that a debtor may exempt "[p]rofes-
sionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor."
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prescribed health aids. The policy of section 522(f)(2) is one advo-
cated by the Federal Trade Commission.218 The FTC maintains
that a creditor who takes a nonpurchase-money security interest
in all the consumer's household goods does so not to obtain secu-
rity, but rather to obtain leverage over the consumer.2 19 The con-
sumer's household goods will typically have little resale value.
These goods are, however, essential to the consumer, and they
may have a high replacement cost."' Thus, by using threats of
repossession the creditor can extract from the consumer pay-
ments which far exceed the value of the collateral. Because of the
potential for creditor abuse inherent in nonpurchase-money secu-
rity interests in consumer goods, the FTC has proposed a trade
regulation rule under which taking a nonpurchase-money security
interest in household necessities would be an unfair trade prac-
tice.22' The inclusion of section 522(f)(2) in the Code is designed
to accomplish at least two goals. First, the provision was intended
to implement the above stated FTC policy of deterring the prac-
tice of claiming nonpurchase-money security interests in con-
sumer necessities. 2 2 Second, by allowing the debtor to avoid such
security interests the provision was intended to preclude the pos-
sibility that the debtor might be compelled to reaffirm a dis-
218. See Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess., ser. 27, pt. 2 at 758-63 (statement of David H. Williams, Federal Trade Commis-
sion), reprinted in H.R. RE. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 166-73. See also Proposed Trade
Regulation Rule Involving Credit Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. §§ 444.1-.2), reprinted in [1975] 4 TRADE-REG. REPp. (CCH) 38,034. See note
226 infra. For a collection of articles on the FTC's activities in this area, see Student
Symposium on the Proposed FTC Rule on Credit Practices, 8 CONN. L. Rnv. 450 (1976).
219. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 171-72.
220. Id.
221. The Proposed Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, supra note 218,
provides:
In connection with the extension of credit to consumers. . . it is an unfair act
or practice within the meaning of Section 5 of [the Federal Trade Commission]
Act for a lender or retail installment seller directly or indirectly:
(a) To take or receive from a consumer an obligation which ...
(4) Constitutes or contains a security interest other than a Purchase
Money security interest, except, where the proceeds of a personal loan are not
to be primarily applied to the purchase of consumer goods, the lender may take
a security interest in other than household goods.
Id. (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4)). See Student Symposium, Security-In
Whose Interest? The FTC's Proposed Restrictions on Blanket Security and Cross-
Collateral Clauses: § 444.2(a)(4), (5), (6) of the Rule on Credit Practices, 8 CoN. L. Ray.
511 (1976).
222. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 179.
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charged debt in order to retain his essential goods. 211
The debtor's right to avoid a nonpurchase-money security
interest under section 522(f)(2), however, is dependent upon the
security interest impairing an exemption to which the debtor
would have been entitled under section 522(b).224 Assuming that
the General Assembly enacts legislation depriving the debtor of
the right to claim the federal exemptions, the avoiding power of
section 522(f)(2) would be virtually eliminated. Depriving debtors
of the avoiding power under section 522(f)(2) will not, however,
grant secured creditors uncontrolled power to force debtors into
unfair reaffirmation agreements in order to retain possession of
their consumer goods because the Code now controls these agree-
ments. 225 Nevertheless, denying debtors the power to avoid
nonpurchase-money security interests in the essential consumer
goods enumerated in section 522(f)(2)(A)-(C) will result in a
greater number of enforceable reaffirmation agreements. To this
extent depriving debtors of the right to claim the federal exemp-
tions may frustrate the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act.
The second provision in the Bankruptcy Code that limits the
enforceability in bankruptcy of security interests in consumer
goods is section 722.228 Section 722 grants an individual debtor a
223. See id. at 126-27.
224. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 522(f)(2). For the text of this section, see note
216 supra.
225. Section 524(d) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the bankruptcy court to approve
an individual debtor's agreement to reaffirm a discharged debt in order for the reaffirma-
tion agreement to be enforceable. Under § 524(c) (4) the court will approve a reaffirmation
of a consumer debt secured by an interest in personal property only if one of two sets of
conditions is satisfied. First, under § 524(c)(4) (A) the court can approve the reaffirmation
only if the agreement does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or his dependents,
and the reaffirmation is in the best interests of the debtor. Presumably, a court would not
find a reaffirmation to be in the best interests of the debtor if the amount of the reaffirmed
debt exceeds the fair market value of the collateral or at least its replacement cost.
Second, under § 524(c)(4)(B) the court can approve a reaffirmation agreement if it finds
that the agreement was entered into in good faith and in settlement of litigation over the
dischargeability of the debt or to finance a redemption under § 722. Significantly, the debt
financed in a redemption cannot exceed the amount of the creditor's allowed secured
claim. The amount of the allowed secured claim is determined under § 506(a) and equals
the value of the collateral. See text at notes 226-242 infra.
226. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 722, provides:
An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right
to redeem under this section, redeem tangible personal property intended pri-
marily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargea-
ble consumer debt, if such property is exempted under section 522 of this title
or has been abandoned under section 544 of this title, by paying the holder of
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limited right to redeem tangible personal property intended pri-
marily for personal, family, or household use from a lien securing
a dischargeable consumer debt.2 The debtor may redeem the
property and retain it free of the lien by paying the lienholder the
amount allowed as a secured claim. 2 1 The amount allowed as a
secured claim is determined under section 506(a) and equals the
fair market value of the collateral securing the debt. 29 For exam-
ple, assume that a consumer borrows $1,500 to pay household
expenses from a finance company pursuant to a security agree-
ment that grants the finance company a security interest in his
automobile. Assume further, that the consumer subsequently
files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy for liquidation. On the
date of filing the petition the amount of the debt that the con-
sumer owes the finance company remains at $1,500 and the value
of his automobile is $1,000. Under section 722, the consumer may
be entitled to redeem the automobile from the finance company's
security interest by paying the finance company $1,000, the
amount of its secured claim.
The right to redeem, however, is limited to property that is
either exempt under section 522 or abandoned under section
554.20 Both the language of section 722 and the legislative history
behind its enactment indicate that the drafters of section 722
contemplated that the debtor seeking to redeem property would
be entitled to claim the federal exemptions.2 1 The property to
which section 722 applies, "tangible personal property intended
primarily for personal, family, or household use" is exempt under
section 522(d) .22 Thus, if South Carolina enacts legislation that
deprives a debtor of the right to claim the federal exemptions, the
General Assembly will limit the availability of the remedy of
redemption to those situations in which the consumer goods have
such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured
by such lien.
227. Id.
228. Id. § 506(a).
229. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 356-57.
230. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 722. See note 226 supra.
231. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 127-28.
232. "Tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or house-
hold use" includes the following types of property exempt under § 522(d): a mobile home
the debtor uses as a residence, § 522(d)(1); an automobile, § 522(d)(2); household furnish-
ings, household goods, wearing apparel, and appliances, § 522(d)(3); jewelry, § 522(d)(4);
and professionally prescribed health aids, § 522(d)(9). Furthermore, the right to redeem
extends to the whole of the property, not just the debtor's exempt interest in it. See H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 381.
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Despite the observations set forth above, the enactment of
legislation depriving debtors of the right to claim the federal ex-
emptions will not frustrate the basic policy that sections 522(f) (2)
and 722 seek to implement. The principal purpose of these provi-
sions is to limit the enforceability of security interests in con-
sumer goods in order to prevent a creditor from using such a
security interest as a leverage device to force the debtor into an
unfair reaffirmation agreement. A reaffirmation agreement is
unfair to a debtor only when the amount of the debt reaffirmed
exceeds the value of the collateral. In other words, the potential
for abuse exists when the creditor is only partially secured.M In
the consumer context a creditor holding a nonpurchase-money
security interest in household goods, the situation envisioned in
section 522(f)(2), is typically partially secured. Furthermore, par-
tial security is not atypical when the creditor holds either a
purchase-money or nonpurchase-money security interest in con-
sumer goods, the situation envisioned in section 722. When a
creditor holds a security interest in consumer goods that have a
value of less than the amount of the secured debt, the debtor can
avert the possibility of an unfair reaffirmation agreement even if
the consumer goods subject to the security interest are not ex-
empt.
Under section 722 an individual debtor is entitled to redeem
not only exempt consumer goods from a security interest securing
a consumer debt, but also goods that have been abandoned by the
trustee under section 554.231 As the definition of consumer goods
in section 722 is broad enough to cover all items of personal prop-
erty described in section 522(f)(2) except for the implements of a
debtor's trade,m clearly a debtor may have the right to redeem
those goods from the nonpurchase-money security interests envi-
sioned in section 522(f)(2). The crucial issue for the application
of section 722 to nonexempt consumer goods is whether they are
abandoned. Section 554(b) provides that "[o]n request of a
party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may
order the trustee to abandon any property of the estate. . . that
233. See text at notes 171-80 supra.
234. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 554(a). "After notice and a hearing, the
trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that
is of inconsequential value to the estate." Id.
235. See notes 216 and 217 supra.
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is of inconsequential value to the estate."" 6 If consumer goods of
the debtor are fully encumbered by a security interest, the goods
are of no value to the estate. The debtor, as a party in interest,
can thus request and obtain from the court an order to the trustee
to abandon the goods. 37 Having compelled the trustee to abandon
the consumer goods, the debtor may redeem them under section
722.?1 The first step in effecting the redemption is for the debtor
to file the creditor's claim under section 501(c) in the event the
creditor has refrained from filing.29 Once the creditor's claim is
filed, the debtor can obtain a determination of the secured status
of the claim under section 506(a). Y The court will deem the credi-
tor's claim a secured claim to the extent of the value of the credi-
tor's interest in the property. In other words the amount of the
secured claim is equal to the current value of the collateral. In the
instances envisioned as having the potential for secured creditor
abuse under sections 522(f)(2) and 722, the amount of the secured
claim will be significantly less than the debt. The debtor is then
entitled to redeem the property by paying the creditor the
amount of the secured claim.2 1 Furthermore, although one may
question the debtor's ability to generate the cash needed to re-
deem the property, the Code clearly contemplates that the debtor
can finance the redemption by entering a reaffirmation agree-
ment under which the debtor can pay the creditor the value of
its secured claim over time at a reasonable rate of interest.
242
A proposal to reaffirm the amount of the secured claim should
be more attractive to the creditor than repossession because the
creditor is saved the expenses of repossession and resale. Thus,
the General Assembly can enact legislation depriving debtors of
the right to claim the federal exemptions enumerated in section
236. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 554(b).
237. The debtor should be viewed as a party in interest for the purpose of effecting
an abandonment of the property, when the abandonment is essential to effecting a re-
demption. The Code does not define "party in interest." Presumably this point will be
clarified when new Bankruptcy Rules are promulgated under 28 U.S.C. § 2075 as amended
by Pub. L. No. 95.598, § 247, 92 Stat. 2672.
238. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 722. For the text of this section see note 226
supra.
239. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 501(c) provides, "If a creditor does not timely
file a proof of such creditor's claim, the debtor or the trustee may file a proof of such
claim."
240. Id. § 506(a). See text at notes 228 and 229 supra.
241. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 506(a).
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522(d) of the Code without frustrating the operation of the Code
provisions by which Congress intended to preclude secured credit
abuse.
3. The Availability of Alternatives: Costs and
Benefits.-Two points have been established. First, unless the
General Assembly enacts a specific statute depriving debtors of
the right to claim the federal exemptions enumerated in section
522(d), a substantial and perhaps irresistible incentive to file
consumer bankruptcies will arise with the probable result of a
significant increase in the rate of consumer bankruptcies in South
Carolina. Second, the General Assembly can enact legislation
depriving debtors of the federal exemptions without frustrating
the operation of those provisions of the Code designed to curb
secured credit abuse in consumer bankruptcies. Given this frame-
work, one must assess the costs and benefits of depriving the
debtors of the right to claim the federal exemptions, and consider
the availability of alternate measures before endorsing such legis-
lation.
The principal cost of enacting legislation depriving debtors
of the right to claim the federal exemptions in a bankruptcy
proceeding is that such legislation may preclude the discharged
debtor from retaining property sufficient to obtain a fresh start
in life. If such legislation is enacted, a South Carolinian would be
effectively limited to asserting the State's statutory exemptions
in bankruptcy proceedings.24 3 It is apparent that the exemptions
243. Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(2) would limit the debtor's exemption in bankruptcy
to that property exempt under federal law other than § 522(d) and under the state law of
the debtor's domicile. A debtor claiming exemptions under § 522(b)(2) is also entitled to
retain his interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant, provided that the interest is
exempt from judicial process under state law. South Carolina does not recognize the estate
of tenancy by the entirety. See Davis v. Davis, 223 S.C. 182, 75 S.E.2d 46 (1953). South
Carolina does recognize joint tenancy with a right of survivorship. See Note, Cotenancies,
Estates of, in South Carolina, 11 S.C.L.Q. 520 (1959). Presumably, however, South Caro-
lina would follow the majority rule and subject the interest of such a cotenant to judicial
process. See 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 618, at 672 (rev. ed. 1979).
Furthermore, the debtor's property that will constitute the bankruptcy estate under § 541
of the Bankruptcy Code is more extensive than the property the title to which vests in
the trustee under § 70a of the Bankruptcy Act. In applying § 70a(5) of the Act the
Supreme Court has held that the definition of "property" under § 70a(5) is a matter of
federal law to be determined by the policies of the Bankruptcy Act. See Segal v. Rochelle,
382 U.S. 375 (1966); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974). The Court has held that a
bankrupt's right to accrued vacation pay does not constitute property under section
70a(5). Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970). See also In re Schmelzer, 480 F.2d 1074
(6th Cir. 1973) (cause of action for personal injury does not constitute property). Under §
541 of the Bankruptcy Code debtors will not be entitled to retain property under the theory
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available to a debtor under South Carolina law are antiquated
and inadequate to provide even minimal protection to a modem
consumer. Many consumers own no interest in real estate and
thus the $1,000 homestead exemption is useless to them. Even if
the debtor does own real estate, the $1,000 exemption may be
inadequate to enable the debtor to retain either his residence or
land sufficient to generate an income. The maximum personal
property exemption of $500 may be inadequate to allow a debtor
to retain even the basic household goods essential to the well-
being of the debtor and his dependents. Thus, incorporating these
exemptions into a bankruptcy proceeding may leave the dis-
charged debtor with insufficient property to realize his opportun-
ity for a fresh start in life. The debtor will then be immediately
forced back into the consumer credit market to obtain necessities
for himself and his dependents. The discharged debtor will thus
be in the same financial circumstances that caused or contributed
to his original bankruptcy.
The principal benefit to be derived from enacting legislation
that deprives debtors of the right to claim the federal exemptions
is avoiding the increased costs and reduced availability of con-
sumer credit that would result in the absence of such legislation.
As discussed above if debtors are entitled to claim the federal
exemptions a significant increase in the number of consumer
bankruptcies filed in South Carolina would ensue under the new
Code. 24 Furthermore, in these bankruptcies there would rarely be
any nonexempt property available to apply toward satisfaction of
the unsecured claims. Thus, large losses would result.- These
losses would be borne in the first instance by the consumer credit
community. The supply of consumer credit appears to be moder-
ately elastic. 245 Therefore, as the financial market adjusts, these
costs will be passed on to consumers in the form of increased
interest rates and decreased availability of consumer credit.
4 6
Consumers who pay their debts and consumers who will be un-
able to obtain credit will ultimately bear most of the costs gener-
ated by the increased rate of consumer bankruptcies. 147 The im-
that a given property interest does not fall within the federal definition of property. See
H. R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 368.
244. See text at notes 199-211 supra.
245. See Weston, Some Economic Fundamentals for an Analysis of Bankruptcy, 41
L. CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1977, at 47.
246. See Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the
State, 41 L. CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1977, at 13.
247. Id. at 27.
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pact of an increase in cost and a decrease in the availability of
consumer credit would tend to work a hardship upon all consum-
ers and upon the economy of South Carolina. Thus, substantial
benefits to consumers as a whole and to the economy of the State
would flow from depriving debtors of the right to claim the federal
exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings.
Weighing the costs against the benefits to be derived from
enacting legislation depriving debtors of the right to claim the
federal exemptions is, perhaps necessarily, a matter of some spec-
ulation. Nevertheless, it appears to the author that such legisla-
tion is on balance advisable. Such legislation is not, however, the
optimal solution to the problems presented. As will be discussed
below, the best resolution would be to enact narrow but adequate
state law exemptions that would apply both under state law and
in bankruptcy proceedings. The General Assembly, however, can-
not pursue such a course of action. Article Il, section 28 of the
constitution of South Carolina and the doctrine of Duncan v.
Barnett preclude the General Assembly from enacting exemp-
tions more liberal than those set forth in the constitution. Thus,
given the alternatives available, the General Assembly should
promptly enact a statute specifically depriving debtors of the
right to claim the federal exemptions in cases filed under the
Bankruptcy Code.2 1
V. PROPOSED CONsTiTuTIONAL AMENDMENT AND LEGISLATION
The General Assembly should promptly enact legislation
authorized under section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code spe-
cifically depriving debtors of the right to claim the exemptions
enumerated in section 522(d). Unless such legislation is in effect
prior to October 1, 1979,249 there could be a sharp increase in the
number of consumer bankruptcies. Furthermore, because of the
size of the federal exemptions individual liquidation cases com-
menced under the Code will rarely provide a distribution to the
unsecured creditors.
248. Such legislation was introduced and referred to committee on May 29, 1979.
S. 563, A Bill to amend the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, By adding Section
15-41-425, so as to provide that No Individual May Exempt From the Property of the
Estate in Any Bankruptcy Proceeding the Property Specified in Subsection (d) of Sec.
tion 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act (Public Law 95-598) Except as May Otherwise
Be Expressly Permitted By The Laws of This State. See S.J.S.C. No. 82 at 6 (May 29,
1979).
249. This is the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, § 402, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
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This legislation, however, should be viewed as a stop-gap
measure. South Carolina's existing statutory exemptions are ei-
ther unconstitutional or outmoded. This condition exists because
under the constitution the General Assembly lacks the power to
enact statutes that vary from the terms of article HI, section 28
of the constitution.250 The first step in modernizing South Caro-
lina's statutory exemptions is to amend the constitution to repeal
the existing article III, section 28 and to substitute in its place a
broad grant of power to the General Assembly to enact reasonable
exemption statutes.2 5' The General Assembly should commence
the process of constitutional amendment. 2
Assuming that the constitutional amendment suggested
above is approved by the voters and ratified, the General Assem-
bly will be presented with the task of enacting "reasonable" ex-
emptions.253 In approaching this problem the General Asembly
should be mindful of the interrelationship between state law ex-
emptions and federal bankruptcy. Specifically, the General As-
sembly should be guided by several basic policies. First, the Gen-
eral Assembly must recognize that an incentive to file in bank-
ruptcy will arise if a debtor can retain more of his property in
bankruptcy than he can under state law.211 As the cost of con-
sumer bankruptcies will ultimately be borne by consumers, the
General Assembly should avoid creating any significant dispari-
ties between the exemptions available under state law and in
bankruptcy. Second, a debtor should be entitled to retain free
from the claims of his judgment creditors sufficient property to
enable him to provide the essentials for the well-being of himself
and his dependents."5 In the context of bankruptcy this policy
translates to allowing the debtor to retain sufficient property free
from the claim of the trustee to enable the debtor to obtain an
250. See text at notes 39-47 supra.
251. Such an amendment was proposed in The Report of the Committee to Make a
Study of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895 47 (1969). For discussions of the changes
in the exemptions under the constitutions of other states, see Adams, Homestead Legisla-
tion in California, 9 PAc. L.J. 723 (1978); Maines & Maines, Our Legal Chameleon Revis-
ited: Florida's Homestead Exemption, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 297 (1978); Wall, supra note 1,
at 895-925.
252. For the procedure for amending the constitution, see S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1
(1895).
253. For a discussion and critique of the Uniform Exemptions Act proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, see Comment, supra note
1, at 473-83.
254. See text at notes 199-211 supra.
255. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 126.
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opportunity for a fresh start in life. Third, the exemptions
granted should be narrowly drawn so that a debtor cannot avoid
paying his just debts while retaining more property than is neces-
sary to provide for his essential well-being.
A. Exemptions of Property Other Than Earnings
Turning initially to the exemption of property other than
earnings for personal services, the first policy outlined above dic-
tates that the exemptions available under South Carolina law be
the same as those available in bankruptcy. One method of achiev-
ing this policy would be simply to enact legislation depriving
debtors of the right to claim the federal exemptions in bank-
ruptcy, and leaving the current South Carolina statutory exemp-
tions unamended. As stated above, such a course of action is
undesirable because the current statutory exemptions are anti-
quated and inadequate to protect a debtor's essential possessions.
Furthermore, the application of these exemptions in bankruptcy
would tend to frustrate a debtor's ability to obtain a fresh start
in life. In short, such a course of action would violate the second
policy consideration set forth above.
A second method by which the General Assembly might
achieve parity between state and federal exemptions would be to
refrain from enacting legislation depriving debtors of the federal
exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings and to amend the State's
statutory exemptions to conform to section 522(d) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. This course of action appears undesirable for two
principal reasons. First, granting exemptions enumerated in sec-
tion 522(d) would render almost all consumers judgment proof.
Such an action would tend to increase the cost and to reduce the
availability of consumer credit. Such a trend would be detrimen-
tal to both consumers and the economy of the State. Second,
allowing debtors to claim the federal exemptions in bankruptcy
proceedings would create a strong, if short term, incentive to file
in bankruptcy even if the legislature enacted state exemptions
identical to the federal exemptions. The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that the contract clause of the United States Con-
stitution prohibits the retrospective application of state exemp-
tion statutes.26 Although commentators have questioned the cur-
256. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934); Bank of Minden v. Clement,
256 U.S. 126 (1921); Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872).
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rent validity of this interpretation of the contract clause, 257 South
Carolina's power to enforce retrospectively increased state ex-
emptions is subject to serious doubt. In contrast, the constitu-
tional grant of power to enact bankruptcy laws enables Congress
to impair the obligation of contract.2ss Therefore, Congress has
the power to enact retrospective exemption provisions applicable
in bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, debtors could claim the federal
exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings against all creditors, but
could claim the increased state exemptions against only those
creditors whose claims arose out of transactions occurring after
the effective date of the new exemption law.
A third alternative would be for the General Assembly to
increase the state law exemptions to an amount that is reasonable
in light of current economic conditions, and to preclude debtors
from claiming the federal exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings.
The exemptions should be adequate but limited to an amount
actually necessary to enable a debtor to maintain a decent stan-
dard of living. Moreover, the legislation should not specify the
types of property which can be claimed as exempt. The legislation
should set a dollar figure limitation upon the exemptions and
allow the debtor to choose the property upon which he claims the
exemption.25 In 1868 when the original homestead exemption was
adopted, land was the primary source of income."' The drafters
of the 1868 exemption allowed a debtor to retain a significant
interest in land because they believed that an interest in land was
essential to enable a debtor to generate sufficient income to pro-
vide for his family and satisfy his creditors. 26' In a nonagrarian
society, the homestead exemption can be defended only on the
257. See Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGaS L.
Rav. 678, 727 (1960); Comment, The Contract Clause and the Constitutionality of Retro-
active Application of Exemption Statutes: A Reconsideration, 9 PAC. L.J. 889 (1978). In
1976 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
Uniform Exemptions Act. The Commissioners determined that the contract clause argu-
ment against retrospective application of state exemption statutes had lost its validity.
UNIFORM EXEMI TIONs ACT § 23, Comment (2). Therefore, in section 23(b) of the Act the
Commissioners provided, "All provisions of this Act apply to the collection of claims
arising before and after the effective date and to the enforcement of judgments rendered
or entered before and after that date, but do not govern a levy made before that date."
13 U.L.A. 45 (Supp. 1978).
258. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 452 (1937); Hanover Nat'l Bank v.
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
259. See Comment, supra note 1, at 471-73.
260. See D. WALLAcE, SOUTH CAROuNA: A SHORT HIsToRY 687-90 (1961).
261. See 1868 PROCEEDIONS, supra note 4, at 473, 496.
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ground that a dwelling is a necessity. 262 In view of the limited
amount of the homestead exemption, however, it rarely allows a
debtor to retain his dwelling.263 In practice, the homestead ex-
emption operates to grant land-owning debtors an indirect cash
exemption of $1,000 drawn from the proceeds of the sale of the
homestead. By allowing a debtor free choice this anachronism can
be eliminated.
This third approach is also consistent with the other policies
outlined above. The increased state exemptions would apply
equally in state law collection proceedings and in bankruptcy
proceedings. Furthermore, the exemptions would apply prospec-
tively in both state law collection actions and bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.24 Therefore, the ability to obtain increased exemptions
would not provide an incentive to file in bankruptcy. Finally, the
enactment of adequate but narrow exemptions would further
sound bankruptcy policy. The exemptions should be sufficient to
enable a debtor forced to file a petition for liquidation under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code to retain enough property to
obtain a fresh start in life.25 The exemptions should not, however,
encourage the financially embarrassed consumer to resort to a
liquidation proceeding. The exemption statutes should be nar-
rowly drawn in order to encourage these debtors to seek relief
under Chapter 13.26 Under Chapter 13 a debtor is entitled to
retain all his property free from the claims of his unsecured credi-
tors.26 The creditors' claims are satisfied out of the debtor's fu-
ture income rather than from the liquidation of the nonexempt
property he owned on filing.28 Under the current Bankruptcy Act,
creditors recover a much larger portion of their claims when a
debtor elects to file a Chapter XIII wage-earner plan rather than
262. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 797-98 (1974).
263. Id. at 801-02.
264. See Kener v. La Grange Mills, 231 U.S. 215 (1913); England v. Sanderson, 236
F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956). But see Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in
Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGEas L. REv. 678, 727-32 (1960).
265. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 126.
266. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, §§ 1301-1330.
267. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 3, at 118.
268. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 1322(a)(1).
Although the Bankruptcy Code makes significant changes in the area, the following
articles can be consulted for general background on the use of Chapter Xm Wage Earner
Plans: Bare, The New Rules in Straight and Chapter XIIIBankruptcies, 41 TENN. L. Rav.
567 (1974); Wickham, Bankruptcy or Not? Advice for Attorneys Who Counsel Consumer
Debtors, 41 TENN. L. Rav. 667 (1974); Note, The Chapter XIII Wage Earner Petition
Under the New Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, 4 MEm. ST. L. REv. 554 (1974).
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in straight bankruptcy."9 There is no reason that different results
should be expected under the Bankruptcy Code. Encouraging
debtors to file for relief under Chapter 13 rather than under Chap-
ter 7 should have a positive effect on cost and availability of
consumer credit, and thereby benefit the economy. An effective
way to encourage debtors to file under Chapter 13 rather than
Chapter 7 is to insure that the debtor will be able to retain sub-
stantially more of his property if he files under Chapter 13. Enact-
ing adequate but narrow state exemption statutes and making
them applicable in Chapter 7 liquidation cases would achieve this
result.
B. Exemption of Earnings for Personal Services
The exemption of earnings for personal services presents
somewhat more difficult problems of policy resolution. Initially
the General Assembly can act only within the limitations im-
posed by the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968.20
In most actions the Act limits "garnishment"' to an amount not
in excess of twenty-five percent of a debtor's disposable earn-
ings.2 17 In resolving this issue the General Assembly should be
mindful of the three policies outlined above. Specifically, the
General Assembly should recognize that allowing a creditor hold-
ing a claim that is dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding to
subject a debtor's earnings to judicial process will create an in-
centive for the debtor to file in bankruptcy. Second, the General
Assembly should consider that subjecting a debtor's earnings to
judicial process can be a harsh remedy that may operate to de-
prive a debtor of the ability to retain and acquire the necessities
of life. Third, despite these shortcomings, the General Assembly
should recognize that subjecting a debtor's earnings to judicial
process is an efficient collection device and will facilitate the
enforcement of judgments.
1. Prejudgment.-Once the constitution is amended, the
General Assembly should adhere to the position set forth in sec-
tion 37-5-104 and prohibit attachment or prejudgment garnish-
ment of earnings for personal services.2 13 The due process require-
269. See Girth, The Bankruptcy Reform Process: Maximizing Judicial Control in
Wage Earners' Plans, 11 J.L. REF. 51, 54 (1977).
270. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1693r (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
271. See note 111 supra (definition of garnishment).
272. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976).
273. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-104 (1976).
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ments imposed upon a prejudgment wage garnishment by
Sniadach would require the adoption of a cumbersome statutory
procedure similar to the preseizure hearing provisions of the
claim and delivery statute.24 Furthermore, Sniadach has been
interpreted to allow a creditor to garnish a debtor's earnings upon
a mere showing of the probable validity of the creditor's claim.27
This standard is too lax to be applied to earnings for personal
services. Although the creditor has established the probable va-
lidity of his claim, the debtor may have a valid defense that
would enable him to prevail at a final hearing on the merits. The
creditor, having garnished the debtor's earnings may, however, be
able to force the debtor to abandon his defenses and to agree to
refinance the disputed claim in exchange for a release of the
garnished earnings.26 Thus, the debtor may be deprived of an
opportunity to present his defense. Prejudgment collection reme-
dies should not be invoked to give a creditor leverage to force the
settlement of a disputed claim. The proper sphere of prejudgment
collection remedies is limited to providing a creditor with neces-
sary security for the collection of a debt. 7 Since earnings for
personal services are perhaps a consumer's most essential asset,
prejudgment garnishment may give a creditor unconscionable
leverage to force a debtor to settle a claim. The General Assembly
should preclude this abuse by prohibiting prejudgment garnish-
ment or attachment of earnings for personal services in all ac-
tions.
2. Postjudgment.-Postudgment process against earnings
for personal services should be evaluated primarily through a
societal perspective. An order in supplementary proceedings di-
recting the application of earnings for personal services towards
satisfaction of a judgment is an efficient collection procedure.
The remedy may enable creditors to satisfy debts that are uncol-
lectable under South Carolina's current creditors' remedies. In
many cases the only unencumbered asset that a debtor can apply
toward satisfaction of a jugment is his earnings for personal serv-
ices. Allowing a debtor to retain these earnings free from the
274. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-69-40, 15-69-50, 15-69-70 (1976).
275. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342-43 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(1969); Rogoski v. Hammond, 9 Wash. App. 500, 513 P.2d 285 (1973).
276. See Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43
WASH. L. Rav. 743, 753 (1968), quoted in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 341 (1969).
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claims of his creditors imposes unnecessary losses upon the credi-
tors. The bulk of these losses are passed on to consumers through
increased interest rates and decreased availability of credit. If
postjudgment wage garnishment would allow creditors to satisfy
currently uncollectable obligations, the savings to the credit com-
munity should be passed on to consumers in the form of lower
interest rates and greater availability of credit. Thus, there is a
societal benefit to be derived from subjecting earnings for per-
sonal services to postjudment judicial process.
Subjecting earnings for personal services to judicial process,
however, also imposes societal costs. Such process would tend to
increase the rate of consumer bankruptcies in South Carolina. A
significant increase in the number of consumer bankruptcies will
adversely affect the economy. In consumer straight bankruptcies
the holders of unsecured claims typically receive no distribution
from the estateY8 Although these losses will be borne in the first
instance by the consumer credit community, they will be passed
on to consumers through increased interest rates and decreased
availability of credit. This economic analysis, however, must be
applied carefully. Not every consumer bankruptcy triggered by
wage garnishment imposes additional losses upon the consumer's
creditors. The bankruptcy may serve to formalize rather than
create the loss. In many cases an order to apply earnings toward
satisfaction of a judgment will merely expose a hopeless financial
situation. The consumer's debts may be no more uncollectable
after bankruptcy than before bankruptcy. Thus, in these cases,
filing a bankruptcy petition will not increase costs of providing
consumer credit that will be passed on to consumers.
In terms of societal costs and benefits the General Assem-
bly's task is to determine a level of postjudgment judicial process
against earnings that will minimize the costs of extending con-
sumer credit. The amount fixed by the General Assembly should
be large enough to provide creditors with an effective collection
device, but not so large that it will force debtors with the ability
to pay their debts to file in bankruptcy. In 1973 the Bankruptcy
278. See D. STANLFY & M. Gmra, supra note 127, at 87-93 (1971). The authors found
that "[unsecured creditors who proved claims were paid in one out of four cases and
received only 7 percent of the amounts proved and allowed. . . . [I]n more than half of
the cases distributions amounted to less than $100." Id. at 92-93. Many times creditors
do not bother to file proof of their claims. Id. at 89-90. Of the claims scheduled at the start
of the bankruptcy case, only ten percent of the unsecured creditors filed proof of their
claims in nonbusiness bankruptcies. Id. at 90.
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Commission concluded that the limitations imposed by the Fed-
eral Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 were adequate to
prevent garnishment from triggering unnecessary consumer
bankruptcies.2T9 Although the Consumer Credit Protection Act
adequately protects debtors whose earnings do not markedly ex-
ceed thirty times the federal minimum wage, the maximum expo-
sure of twenty-five percent of a debtor's disposable earnings may
be too harsh and trigger unnecessary bankruptcies. 21° The General
Assembly should certainly consider providing a larger exemption
than that provided by the Consumer Protection Act. Another
method the General Assembly could adopt that would protect
consumers and avoid triggering consumer bankruptcies would be
to grant the judge in supplementary proceedings discretion to
reduce the amount of earnings to be applied toward satisfaction
of a judgment in hardship cases. Prior to the statutory abolition
of the application of earnings toward satisfaction of a judgment,
the court was granted such discretion.
28'
3. Enforcement of Nondischargeable Debts.-The General
Assembly could take limited advantage of the efficiency of allow-
ing a judgment creditor to enforce his judgment against earnings
and minimize the risk that such process would trigger bankrupt-
cies if such process were limited to enforcing judgments upon the
type of debts that can be excepted from a debtor's discharge in
bankruptcy. Both the Bankruptcy Act 2 2 and the Bankruptcy
Code"3 provide that certain obligations can be excepted from a
debtor's discharge. If a creditor can establish that the debt owed
to him is subject to an exception, the discharge in bankruptcy will
not release the debtor from personal liability upon the debt. 28
Therefore, filing a petition in bankruptcy would afford a debtor
at best only temporary relief from judicial process against his
earnings brought to enforce a nondischargeable debt. 2 As a re-
sult, if process against earnings were limited to enforcing judg-
279. BmKRuIrCY COMUSSION REPORT, supra note 184 at 9.
280. See generally sources cited in note 127 supra.
281. See 1961 S.C. Acts 450, No. 265 (repealed 1974).
282. Bankruptcy Act § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976).
283. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 1, § 523(a).
284. Bankruptcy Act § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976); Bankruptcy Code, supra note
11, § 524(a). See generally Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 1 (1971).
285. See BAKRUprcy R. 401; Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 362(a)(2). But see
Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 362(b)(2). See generally Kennedy The Automatic Stay
in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 175, 195-202 (1978).
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ments upon debts of the type that would be nondischargeable in
bankruptcy, no significant incentive for the judgment debtor to
file in bankruptcy would arise. Thus, the General Assembly
should consider legislation allowing postjudgment process against
earnings to enforce only those classes of debts excepted from dis-
charge under section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth nine classes
of debts that constitute exceptions to discharge. 26 Although cer-
tain debts are excepted from discharge in order to facilitate bank-
ruptcy administration, most of the exceptions rest upon two basic
policies. First, the debtor should not be relieved of obligations to
those persons who have a high moral or legal claim upon him.27
Second, the debtor should not be relieved of debts that result
from his illegal or fraudulent conduct.2s There are two exceptions
based upon administrative considerations. These include debts
the debtor failed to schedule in the bankruptcy proceeding in
which the discharge is granted,29 and debts that were or could
have been scheduled in a prior bankruptcy proceeding in which
the debtor was denied a discharge.291 Clearly, these exceptions
cannot form a class of debts upon which to base state legislation
allowing judicial process against earnings. Four exceptions are
supported by the first basic policy outlined above. These include:
286. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(1)-(9).
287. See 1 D. CowANs, supra note 150, at § 242.
288. Id.
289. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(3) provides:
A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt...
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(l) of this title, with the
name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time
to permit-
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of
this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor had
notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing; or
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of this
subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a
determination of dischargeability of such debt under one of such para-
graphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case
in time for such timely filing and request . ...
290. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(9) provides:
A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt. ..
(9) that was or could have been listed or scheduled by the debtor in a prior
case concerning the debtor under this title or under the Bankruptcy Act in which
the debtor waived discharge, or was denied a discharge under section 727(a)(2),
(3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of this title, or under section 14c(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), or
(7) of such Act.
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certain taxes owing to a governmental unit,291 certain fines owing
to a governmental unit,22 certain educational loans, 193 and debts
for alimony, maintenance, or child support.94 Three exceptions
are supported by the second basic policy. These include debts for
money, property, or services obtained through actual fraud 95 or
291. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(1) provides:
A discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... for
a tax or a customs duty-
(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or
507(a)(6) of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed;
(B) with respect to which a return, if required-
(i) was not filed; or
(ii) was filed after the date on which such return was last due,
under applicable law or under any extension, and after two years
before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully
attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax ....
292. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(7) provides:
A discharge. . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt. . . to
the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the
benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary
loss, other than a tax penalty-
(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph (1) of this subsec-
tion; or
(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred before
three years before the date of the filing of the petition ....
293. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(8) provides:
A discharge. . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt. . . to
a governmental unit, or a nonprofit institution of higher education, for an educa-
tion loan, unless-
(A) such loan first became due before five years before the date of the
filing of the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose
an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents ....
294. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(5) provides:
A discharge. . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt. . . to
a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for,
or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement,
divorce decree, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that-
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of
law, or otherwise; or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or
support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance,
or support ....
For discussion of the marital exception, see Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obliga-
tions in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REv. 231 (1976); Note, Dissolution of Marriage and the
Bankruptcy Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgotten, 52 IND. L.J. 469 (1977).
295. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(2)(A) provides:
A discharge. . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt. . . for
obtaining money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of
credit, by...
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in certain instances through use of a false financial statement,29
debts for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capac-
ity,"97 and debts for a debtor's willful and malicious injury to
another's person or property. 5 The General Assembly should
consider allowing judicial process against a debtor's earnings to
enforce judgments based upon these seven principled exceptions
to discharge. The claims excepted from discharge are not only
highly meritorious, but also allowing process against earnings to
enforce judgments based upon those claims should not create an
incentive for the judgment debtor to file in bankruptcy.
One class of debts excepted from discharge merits special
consideration-debts for alimony, support, and maintenance. It
has been suggested that South Carolina enact legislation permit-
ting wage garnishment to enforce alimony and support decrees. 99
This proposal was motivated by a desire to take advantage of a
1975 federal statute waiving sovereign immunity and allowing
garnishment of the earnings of federal employees for alimony and
support if a state court had issued a garnishment order.c ° In
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition ....
296. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(2)(B) provides:
A discharge. . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt. . . for
obtaining money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, by...
(B) use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on ivhich the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for
obtaining such money, property, services or credit reasonably
relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent
to deceive ....
297. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(4) provides:
A discharge. . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt...
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzle-
ment, or larceny ....
298. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 11, § 523(a)(6) provides:
A discharge. . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt...
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to
the property of another entity .
299. Perrin, South Carolina Hobbled in Enforcing Alimony/Child Support
Obligations, THE BuLLwN, S.C. TImL LAw. A. 2,3 (July 1975). See also H. 2719 H.J.S.C.
1013 (March 22, 1979) (bill would grant the family court jurisdiction to order garnish-
ment of personal earnings to enforce delinquent alimony or child support payments).
300. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2357
(1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 659 (Cum. Supp. 1979)). Section 659 of Title
42 merely waives the government's sovereign immunity to garnishment in the specified
actions. The actual order for garnishment must be grounded upon state statutory author-
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addition to this particular benefit, such legislation would make
the process of enforcing all alimony and support decrees more
efficient20' Thus, even if the General Assembly concludes that
subjecting earnings for personal services to judicial process is ill
advised, and enacts a general exemption for earnings, the General
Assembly could make an exception to the general exemption and
allow-wage garnishment to enforce alimony and support decrees.
VI. CONCLUSION
The General Assembly should immediately enact legislation
authorized under section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code that
specifically precludes debtors in bankruptcy proceedings from
claiming the exemptions enumerated under section 522(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code. At the same time the General Assembly should
enact a resolution to amend the constitution by repealing article
III, section 28, and adopting a constitutional provision authoriz-
ing the General Assembly to enact reasonable exemption stat-
utes. When the amendment is adopted, the General Assembly
should enact adequate but narrow exemption statutes that will
entitle a debtor to retain free from the claims of his creditors
property sufficient to provide the essentials for his well-being.
The General Assembly should also carefully consider the problem
of subjecting earnings for personal services to judicial process. On
consideration, the legislature may deem it advisable to allow lim-
ited postjudgment wage garnishment.
ity. Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1977); Popple v. United States,
416 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
301. See Perrin, supra note 299, at 4. For a discussion of North Carolina's statute
allowing garnishment for child support, see Note, Remedies-Domestic Relations: Gar-
nishment for Child Support, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 169 (1978).
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